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ABSTRACT
Though existing for several millennia in various cultures, body modifi-
cation through tattooing is becoming more popular in the United
States. Twenty percent of Americans have at least one tattoo, and
among Millennials this number grows to almost forty percent. As the
popularity of tattoos has increased in recent years, so too have ques-
tions revolving around concepts of intellectual property and the plausi-
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ble limitations of any rights stemming therefrom. This Article addresses
the implications, for both the tattooist and the tattooed, of using trade-
marked designations as tattoos. Neither the courts nor Congress have
definitively answered the question of how traditional trademark law
norms apply when a trademark is permanently inked onto the body of a
human being. This Article contends that traditional enforcement norms
related to trademark law are ill equipped to address the myriad ques-
tions that arise with respect to tattoos. In addition, the Article builds on
earlier suggestions that the Thirteenth Amendment necessitates the cre-
ation of exceptions to traditional intellectual property law enforcement
mechanisms when permanent tattoos are at issue.
INTRODUCTION
In 2009, Sam Penix, a coffee enthusiast living in New York, opened a
coffee shop named Everyman Espresso.1 The company’s logo featured an
illustration of Penix’s tattooed fist grabbing a portafilter filled with coffee
between the stylized words Everyman Espresso.2 Penix’s fist, both in real
life and in the illustration, features a tattoo reading “I [coffee cup] NY”
across his knuckles.3 A few years after opening the coffee shop, Everyman
Espresso received a cease and desist letter alleging trademark infringement
from the New York State Department of Economic Development, which
owns the “I ♥ NY” trademark on behalf of the State of New York.4 Despite
his belief that the Everyman Espresso logo was not infringing, Penix and his
business partners complied with letter’s request to remove Penix’s fist from
the logo and to remove the original logo from marketing and other materials.
In addition, Penix agreed to several restrictive limitations on how his fist
could and could not be photographed.5
Around the same time that Everyman Espresso received its cease and
desist letter from the State of New York, another New York company was
garnering viral media exposure for its unique, tattoo-based compensation in-
centive. Rapid Realty, a New York City-based real estate company, offers
1. See Andy Newman, A Cup is at the Heart of a Trademark Dispute, N.Y. TIMES
(May 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/30/nyregion/new-york-challenges-a-coffee-
shop-logo.html?_r=0.
2. Id.
3. Id. Appendix A features photos of both the logo and Penix’s actual fist.
4. Appendix B features a photo of the “I ♥ NY” trademark at issue. The New York
State Department of Economic Development owns a number of federal trademark registrations
featuring the “I ♥ NY” logo on behalf of the State of New York. See e.g., I NY Registration
No. 4,409,927; I NY Registration No. 4,556,267; I NY Registration No. 1,555,836. Allegedly,
the trademark is the subject of countless unauthorized uses, much to the chagrin of the state of
New York. See Anthony Ramirez, To Promote New York, Handlers Take Steps to Reclaim ‘I ♥
NY’, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/12/nyregion/12loveny
.html (noting that “almost all” of “I ♥ NY” merchandise in Midtown Manhattan is infringing).
5. Newman, supra note 1 (stating that Penix has “to keep [his fist] separate from the
promotion of the business and put it away for photos”).
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raises to employees who participated in its Tattoo Brand Ambassadors pro-
gram.6 Through the program, employees who get a tattoo of the company’s
logo, of any shape and in any location, “are permanently raised to the com-
pany’s highest commission split for showing apartments.”7 By May 2013,
forty employees had taken advantage of this program, representing roughly
five percent of Rapid Realty’s workforce.8
Indeed, employers are not the only groups encouraging brand loyalists
to engage in what has been referred to as skinvertising,9 the practice of com-
pensating people for tattooing a company’s brand or logo on their body.10
Other private companies have begun to market their brands in ways that
encourage such activities. Ecko Unlimited, an urban clothing company, of-
fers a lifetime twenty percent discount to customers who have permanent
tattoos of one of two of the company’s trademarked logos.11 Harley-David-
son’s customers famously get the Bar & Shield logo tattooed on their bodies
after purchasing one of the company’s motorcycles.12 Athletes who complete
the World Triathlon Corporation’s Ironman Triathlon consider it a rite of
passage to get the iconic “M-Dot” trademark tattooed on their bodies after
completing the grueling race.13
6. Rapid Tattoos, RAPIDREALTYNYC, http://www.rapidnyc.com/rapidtattoos (last vis-
ited Apr. 26, 2016).
7. Id. The incentive is based on an employee’s ability to sell and rent apartments. An
employee with a Rapid Realty tattoo can receive up to a fifteen percent increase in commission
compensation over employees who do not have such tattoos.
8. See Amy Langfield, Company ink: Agents get 15% Raise for Corporate Tattoos,
TODAYMONEY (May 1, 2013, 11:42 AM), http://www.today.com/money/company-ink-agents-
get-15-raise-corporate-tattoos-6C9714898. Interestingly, the CEO of Rapid Realty did not get
a tattoo of the company’s logo. Id. While all forty of the tattooed employees were still with
Rapid Realty as of 2013, it is unclear whether they are still employed with the company as of
the time of this Article.
9. Drew Guarini, Tattoo Ad Craze Created Human Billboards For Now Defunct Com-
panies, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 18, 2012, 5:06 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/
09/18/tattoo-ads-human-billboards_n_1894235.html.
10. CORMAC MCKEOWN & ELSPETH SUMMERS, COLLINS I SMIRT, YOU STOOZE, THEY
KRUMP: CAN YOU STILL SPEAK ENGLISH? 148-49 (2006).
11. Ecko Offers 20 Percent Off For Life For Anyone Who Gets Tattoo Of Its Logo,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 4, 2011, 8:26 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/04/ecko-
tattoo-logo_n_844306.html.
12. Jonathan Salem Baskin, Harley-Davidson Will Be A Case History In Social Brand-
ing, FORBES (July 12, 2013, 3:06 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathansalembaskin/
2013/07/12/harley-davidson-will-be-a-case-history-in-social-branding.
13. Indeed, a large percentage of athletes who complete the World Triathlon Corpora-
tion’s Ironman races tattoo themselves with the M-Dot trademark. The M-Dot tattoo can sym-
bolize, among other things, personal accomplishment or athletic prowess. See Nick Pauley,
Getting the M dot Ironman Tattoo, IRONMARKETER (Aug. 23, 2013), http://ironmarketer.net/
2013/08/23/the-m-dot-ironman-tattoo. While some people choose the original red M-Dot as a
tattoo, others prefer more customized versions of the M-Dot. See, e.g., Photo Gallary [sic]:
the art of the Ironman tattoo or when a boring M-DOT just won’t do, EVERYMANTRI (May 16,
2010), http://www.everymantri.com/everyman_triathlon/2010/05/photo-gallary-the-art-of-the-
ironman-tattoo-or-when-a-boring-mdot-just-wont-do.html.
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Tattoos based on corporate and organizational trademarks raise legal
concerns that will become more pervasive as tattoos continue to grow in
popularity in the United States.14 Tattoos have, of course, existed for millen-
nia, but they are becoming increasingly more common.15 The number of
tattoo shops in the United States has grown from about 300 in the 1970s16 to
more than 21,000 today.17 Roughly twenty percent of all American adults
have at least one tattoo.18  That number increases to nearly forty percent for
Millennials—Americans born from 1981 to 1991.19 Academic inquiry into
the legal and sociopolitical implications of tattoos has grown significantly
among groups of scholars; courts, too, will ultimately have to address the
myriad issues raised by trademark tattoos.20
The intersection between intellectual property law and tattoos became
the critical issue in a recent lawsuit involving Mike Tyson’s tribal face tat-
too.21 There, S. Victor Whitmill, the tattoo artist who designed and inked
Tyson’s tattoo, sued Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. (“Warner Bros.”) for
copyright infringement because it planned to release a film where one of the
actors bore a tattoo nearly identical to Tyson’s facial tattoo.22 One of the
pressing pre-trial issues stemmed from whether the tattoo could actually be
subject to a copyright claim. Serving as an expert witness, Professor David
Nimmer compared copyright ownership of tattoos on human skin to the
badges of slavery prohibited under the Thirteenth Amendment.23 The
14. See generally Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoos & IP Norms, 98 MINN. L. REV. 511
(2013) (analyzing the intersection of the tattoo industry and intellectual property law).
15. By way of comparison, 6% of Americans aged 65 and above have at least one
tattoo, 15% of Americans aged 46-64 have at least one tattoo, and 32% of Americans aged 30-
45 have at least one tattoo. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., Millennials, A Portrait of Generation
Next 57 (Feb. 2010), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/millennials-confident-con-
nected-open-to-change.pdf.
16. Matthew P. Blanchard, ‘Grandfather’ of tattooing in Philadelphia puts down the
pen at convention, enthusiasts say goodbye to an era., PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb. 9, 2004), http://
articles.philly.com/2004-02-09/news/25374750_1_national-tattoo-association-tattooing-equip-
ment-tattoo-artist.
17. Jason Gale, No Pain No Gain as Tattoo Regret Fueling Laser Removals, BLOOM-
BERG (June 1, 2014, 7:21 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-01/no-pain-
no-gain-as-tattoo-regret-fueling-laser-removals.
18. See Samantha Braverman, One in Five U.S. Adults Now Has a Tattoo, THE HARRIS
POLL (Feb. 23, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.theharrispoll.com/health-and-life/One_in_Five_
U_S__Adults_Now_Has_a_Tattoo.html.
19. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 15, at 57.
20. See Thomas F. Cotter & Angela M. Mirabole, Written on the Body: Intellectual
Property Rights in Tattoos, Makeup, and Other Body Art, 10 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 97 (2003).
21. See Complaint at 1, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., (No. 4:11-CV-752
CDP), 2011 WL 2038147 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 28, 2011), dismissed (E.D. Mo. June 22, 2011)
[hereinafter “Whitmill Complaint”].
22. Id. ¶¶ 4-7.
23. Warner Bros.’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, Declaration of David Nimmer, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., (No. 4:11-
CV-752), 2011 WL 10744102 ¶ 45(E.D. Mo. May 20, 2011) [hereinafter “Nimmer Declara-
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Amendment, which declares that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servi-
tude . . . shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction,”24 had never been raised in this context before. Scholars have
spilled much ink over the copyright questions raised by Professor Nimmer,
but none have yet addressed the connection between trademark law, the
Thirteenth Amendment, and slavery.25
The purpose of this Article is to analyze trademark law and Thirteenth
Amendment issues that arise when private individuals get tattoos that em-
body trademarks owned by others. This Article explores the trend toward
broadening trademark protection for words, symbols, and other designations.
It then examines the ways in which this broadening of trademark enforce-
ment, coupled with current trademark enforcement mechanisms, may signif-
icantly diminish the autonomy of a person tattooed with a trademark owned
by an unrelated person or entity. Finally, the Article explains why the Thir-
teenth Amendment cannot provide a basis for limiting trademark law’s cur-
rent enforcement mechanisms when used against individuals tattooed with
the trademarks of others.
Part I of this Article analyzes the practices of slave branding and current
trademark-based tattoo practices, including skinvertising and tattoos based
on uncompensated brand loyalty. It next summarizes current trademark law,
with a particular focus on trademark enforcement and permissible remedies
against putative infringers. It then outlines the contemporary use of trade-
marks as tattoos in modern society.
Part II of this Article analyzes the rights granted to trademark owners
and the ways such owners may enforce those rights against tattooed parties.
In particular, it discusses the impracticality of applying traditional trademark
infringement principles to alleged or actual infringers.
tion”] (“As applied to tattoos, the only legally cognizable result is to apply the strict require-
ment of physical separability. Such a construction is necessary to avoid the constitutional
infirmity that would arise if the Copyright Act attempted to set at naught the Thirteenth
Amendment’s prohibition of badges of slavery.”).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
25. See, e.g., Matthew Beasley, Who Owns Your Skin: Intellectual Property Law and
Norms Among Tattoo Artists, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1137 (2012); Craig P. Bloom, Hangover
Effect: May I See Your Tattoo, Please, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 435, 439 (2013); David
M. Cummings, Creative Expression and the Human Canvas: An Examination of Tattoos As A
Copyrightable Art Form, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 279 (2013); Christopher A. Harkins, Tattoos
and Copyright Infringement: Celebrities, Marketers, and Businesses Beware of the Ink, 10
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 313 (2006); Meredith Hatic, Who Owns Your Body Art?: The Copy-
right and Constitutional Implications of Tattoos, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA  & ENT.
L.J. 396, 397 (2012); Yolanda M. King, The Challenges “Facing” Copyright Protection for
Tattoos, 92 OR. L. REV. 129 (2013); Christine Lesicko, Tattoos As Visual Art: How Body Art
Fits into the Visual Artists Rights Act, 53 IDEA 39 (2013); see also Cotter & Mirabole, supra
note 20. Most have determined that the Thirteenth Amendment either does not apply at all, or
is only relevant with respect to copyright enforcement measures.
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Part III of this Article contends that the Thirteenth Amendment is not
the appropriate vehicle to insulate tattooed infringers from trademark in-
fringement liability. Though Congress is empowered under the Amendment
to abolish all badges and incidents of slavery, even the broadest interpreta-
tion does not support Professor Nimmer’s view that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment precludes intellectual property enforcement against tattoos.
This Article concludes that, while it is impossible to wholly prohibit
people from permanently inking trademarks on their bodies, current trade-
mark law is ill equipped to resolve trademark infringement problems involv-
ing tattoos. The expansion of trademark rights and enforcement measures
pose threats to the growing number of American citizens with tattoos that
may subject them to civil liability under trademark infringement and/or
trademark dilution principles. Similarly, the blurred lines between private
control and personal autonomy raise serious concerns that cannot be ad-
dressed using the Thirteenth Amendment.
I. THE TRADEMARK’S JOURNEY FROM ENSLAVED SKIN
TO AUTONOMOUS SKIN
This Part outlines the basic historical, legal and policy issues associated
with the practice of placing identifying indicia on human bodies. This prac-
tice predates modern American trademark law and can be traced to the days
of African and African-American enslavement in the United States. The per-
manent, forced body modification of slaves was an early precursor to con-
temporary American use of trademarks as tattoos. As more Americans
voluntarily tattoo their bodies today, a growing segment of this tattooed pop-
ulation encompasses brand enthusiasts who choose to permanently ink their
bodies with the trademarks of their favorite companies and brands and copy-
right-protected images. Coupled with this trend, disputes based on tattoos
encompassing the intellectual property of third parties have also grown in
recent years.26 In perhaps one of the most famous lawsuits based on tattoos
and intellectual property, Whitmill v. Warner Bros., Professor David Nim-
mer posited that the rights of intellectual property owners should not extend
to human flesh, because to do so would create “almost literally, a badge of
involuntary servitude.”27 Otherwise, he argued, the law would “set at naught
the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of badges of slavery.”28 Though
26. See, e.g., Complaint, Escobedo v. THQ, (2:12-CV-02470-JAT), (D. Ariz. Nov. 16,
2012); Complaint, Reed v. Nike, Inc., (3:05- CV-00198), 2005 WL 1182840 (D. Or.  Feb. 10,
2005), dismissed (D. Or. Oct. 19, 2005); Dennis Rodman v. Fanatix Apparel, Inc., Case No.
96-2103 (D.N.J. May 28, 1996).
27. See Nimmer Declaration, supra note 23, at 20. Whitmill was based on a tattoo [al-
legedly] protected under copyright law, though many of the undesirable consequences
imagined by Professor Nimmer would also extend to tattoos embodying the trademarks of
third parties.
28. Id. at 45.
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tenuous, it is understandable why Professor Nimmer would draw connec-
tions between contemporary trademark-based tattoos and the Thirteenth
Amendment’s prohibition of slavery. His suggestion, however, provides
scant historical or factual foundation. This Part will lay the groundwork im-
plicit in such claims before ultimately explaining why the connection is in-
appropriate in the modern context of trademark-based tattoos.
A. The History of Branding African and African-American Slaves
with Primitive Trademarks
Though tattooing words and symbols on human bodies has become in-
creasingly popular in recent decades, it is not a new practice. African and
African-American slaves routinely had the initials or other identifying indi-
cia of their slave masters permanently branded on their skin.29 These invol-
untary “trademarks” were placed on slaves both for purposes of punishment
and identification.30
Prior to the passage of state and federal trademark law, slave owners
used trademarks as a way to distinguish their human property from the prop-
erty of other slave masters. Branding as a mechanism for distinguishing
human property began in 2000-1800 B.C. with Babylonian slaves.31 Within
the Transatlantic slave trade, the practice dates back to at least as early as the
1440s, when the Portuguese branded African slaves’ upper bodies to indicate
that the slaves belonged to the king of Portugal or another slave owner.32
During the time period of African slave trafficking, each European nation
had its own trademark used to mark African slaves.33 Discussing the early
history of slave branding, one scholar outlined the many ways in which slave
branding took place:
[S]laves landed at São Tome were branded with a cross on the right
arm in the early sixteenth century; but, later, this design was
changed to a ‘G,’ the marca de Guiné. Slaves exported from Luanda
were often branded not once but twice, for they had to receive the
mark of the Luso-Brazilian merchants who owned them as well as
the royal arms—on the right breast—to signify their relation to the
Crown. Sometimes, baptism led to the further branding of a cross
29. See CHARLES M. CHRISTIAN ET AL., BLACK SAGA: THE AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERI-
ENCE: A CHRONOLOGY 102-03 (1998); see also Branding Iron, UNDERSTANDING SLAVERY INI-
TIATIVE, http://www.understandingslavery.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
&id=622:branding-iron&Itemid=256 (last visited Apr. 26, 2016).
30. See Leonard Hoenig, The Branding of African American Slaves, 148 JAMA DERMA-
TOLOGY 271 (2012).
31. See SIMON J. BRONNER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN FOLKLIFE 124 (2006) (stating
that the “earliest known branding iron designed for use on humans bear the words ‘I am his
slave’ in cuneiform and dates from 2000-1800 B.C.E. in Babylonia”).
32. See HUGH THOMAS, THE SLAVE TRADE 396 (1999).
33. See id.
232 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 22:225
over the royal design. Slaves of the Royal Africa Company were
marked, with a burning iron upon the right breast, ‘DY,’ duke of
York, after the chairman of the company. In the late eighteenth cen-
tury, a ‘G’ would indicate that the slave concerned had been marked
by the Compañı́a Gaditana, the Cádiz company concerned to import
slaves into Havana in the late 1760s.34
The use of branding significantly decreased after the United States and
England made the importation of African slaves illegal in 1807 and 1808,
but it was revived after the illegal slave trade in the American South, Brazil,
and Cuba became commonplace.35 Frederick Douglass described the process
of American slave branding in 1846 in England: “[a] person was tied to a
post, and his back, or such other part as was to be branded, laid bare; the iron
was then delivered red hot (sensation), and applied to the quivering flesh,
imprinting upon it the name of the monster who claimed the slave.”36
Of course, modern trademark law did not exist during this era, but An-
glo-American law recognized the use of trademarks to identify and distin-
guish goods in the marketplace as early as the sixteenth century.37 It is clear
that slave owners used trademark-like branding to identify certain slaves as
their property and ensure that others could not claim ownership over those
slaves.38 In one 1838 advertisement for a runaway slave, the slave’s owner,
Micajah Ricks of North Carolina, stated that “the woman is tall and black,
and a few days before she went off, I burnt her with a hot iron on the left
side of her face; I tried to make the letter M . . . .”39 This “M” presumably
represented the slave owner’s first name, “Micajah.” Similarly, a slave
34. Id.
35. KYM S. RICE & MARTHA B. KATZ-HYMAN, WORLD OF A SLAVE 78 (2010). Indeed,
there are many recorded instances of runaway slaves being found and identified by the brands
appearing on their bodies. See, e.g., PEDRO FUNARI & CHARLES ORSER, CURRENT PERSPEC-
TIVES ON THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF AFRICAN SLAVERY IN LATIN AMERICA 53 (2015) (recounting
Cuban slave records from 1805 and 1806 where a captured slave was described as “38 years
old, tall and thin, deep black colored, scanty beard, friendly eyes, filed teeth, with a D on his
right breast, confessing he belonged to Don Pedro Diago”).
36. FREDERICK DOUGLASS & JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PA-
PERS 377-78 (Yale University Press 1985).
37. See, e.g., Sanforth’s Case, Cory’s Entries, BL MS. Hargrave 123, fo. 168 (1584),
(providing a portion of the complaint), reprinted in J.H. BAKER & S.F.C. MILSOM, SOURCES OF
ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY - PRIVATE LAW TO 1750 615-18 (1986); Keith M. Stolte, How Early
Did Anglo-American Trademark Law Begin? An Answer to Schechter’s Conundrum, 8 FORD-
HAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 505 (1998).
38. See Hoenig supra note 30; BETTY WOOD, SLAVERY IN COLONIAL AMERICA 1619-
1776 29 (2005); MARCUS WOOD, BLIND MEMORY: VISUAL REPRESENTATIONS OF SLAVERY IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 1780-1865, 249-50 (2000).
39. THEODORE WELD, AMERICAN SLAVERY AS IT IS: TESTIMONY OF A THOUSAND WIT-
NESSES 152 (1968). The actual advertisement can be viewed online through the North Carolina
Runaway Slave Advertisements project website. $20 reward in Nash County, NORTH CARO-
LINA RUNAWAY SLAVE ADVERTISEMENTS, http://libcdm1.uncg.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/
RAS/id/199/rec/1 (last visited Apr. 24, 2016).
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owner from Kentucky was documented as stating that his slave, Jane, bore
his “brand mark on the breast something like L blotched.”40
In this way, slave owners used their own identifying indicia and trade-
marks to distinguish their slaves from others and indicate to whom those
slaves belonged. The Thirteenth Amendment, of course, abolished slavery
and its related practices in 1865.41 Roughly five years later, in 1870, Con-
gress enacted the first federal trademark statute.42
B. Contemporary Trademark Law Landscape
Prior to the enactment of a federal trademark statute, American trade-
mark law’s fundamental purpose was to prevent unapproved parties from
using trademarks in connection with goods or services that the trademark
owner neither created nor sanctioned.43 Early case law supported the view
that a trademark’s critical purpose was to protect the goodwill and reputation
that it signified.44 Scholars of the mid-nineteenth century agreed, noting that,
“to the end that [trademarks] may be known in the market . . . [they] enable
[a trademark owner] to secure such profits as result from a reputation for
superior skill, industry or enterprise.”45 Because there was no federal law
unifying these principles nationwide, however, trademark protection lacked
uniformity and was wholly dependent on intrastate commerce.46 Early
American trademark law was based primarily on judicial decisions, but to
the extent that statutes existed, they were based on state law.47
In 1870, Congress enacted the first federal trademark statute to provide
a nationwide registration system for trademarks used in intrastate or inter-
state commerce.48 The Supreme Court struck down the statute because it
found that the Copyright Clause of the Constitution did not provide Con-
40. Scott W. Howe, Slavery As Punishment: Original Public Meaning, Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishment, and the Neglected Clause in the Thirteenth Amendment, 51 ARIZ. L. REV.
983, 998 (2009).
41. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
42. Act of July 8, 1870, 16 Stat. 198, §§ 77-84, entitled “An Act to Revise, Consolidate
and Amend the Statutes Relating to Patents and Copyrights,” invalidated by Trade-Mark
Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 99 (1879). Prior to this time, American trademark law stemmed predomi-
nantly from the common law and judicial decisions. See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative
Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1859 & n.82 (2007).
43. See McKenna, supra note 42, at 1858-59; R. Darryl Burke, Intellectual Property, 29
TEX. TECH L. REV. 711, 715 (1998).
44. See, e.g., Partridge v. Menck, 2 Barb. Ch. 101, 103 (N.Y. Ch. 1847) (noting that the
complainant was “entitled to protection against any other person who attempts to pirate upon
the goodwill of the complainant’s friends or customers, or of the patrons of his trade or busi-
ness, by sailing under his flag without his authority or consent”).
45. FRANCIS H. UPTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADE MARKS 2 (1860).
46. See McKenna, supra note 42, at 1859 & n.82.
47. Id.
48. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1879).
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gress with the power to regulate trademarks.49 In 1881, Congress made a
second attempt to create a federal trademark statute based on its Commerce
Clause powers, though it did not purport to create a nationwide trademark
registry.50 Congress did not create the first modern federal registration stat-
ute regulating interstate commerce until 1905.51 The statute was heavily re-
vised over the years to remedy perceived inadequacies, ultimately
culminating with the enactment of the Lanham Trademark Act, which took
effect on July 5, 1947 and still applies today.52
The Lanham Act, over time, expanded the goals of modern trademark
law to protect (1) the trademark owner’s property and the goodwill and repu-
tation developed in the trademark, and (2) the consuming public from confu-
sion over trademarks being used in the marketplace.53 The Lanham Act also
expanded the definition of what is protectable, and thus registerable, as a
trademark under federal law. The 1905 commerce Act limited registration to
“technical common-law trademarks” that were fanciful or arbitrary.54 Under
today’s Lanham Act, the definition of the term trademark includes “any
word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof [used] to identify
and distinguish [the trademark owner’s] goods, including a unique product,
from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the
goods, even if that source is unknown.”55 Something may be classified as a
trademark if it is inherently distinctive, as in the case of arbitrary, fanciful or
suggestive trademarks, or  if it has acquired distinctiveness through secon-
dary meaning, as in the case of descriptive trademarks.56
Courts have broadly interpreted this definition—nearly any thing can
serve as a trademark.57 In addition to traditional identifying indicia of trade-
marks like letters, words, symbols and logos, the United States Patent and
49. See id. at 93-94.
50. See Zvi S. Rosen, In Search of the Trade-Mark Cases: The Nascent Treaty Power
and the Turbulent Origins of Federal Trademark Law, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 827, 829 (2009)
(stating that “the 1881 legislation was enacted to call into effect the treaty obligations of the
United States regarding trademarks, not to create a domestic trademark system”).
51. This Act was entitled “An Act to authorize the registration of trademarks used in
commerce with foreign nations or among the several States or with Indian Tribes, and to
protect the same.” Act of Feb. 20, 1905, 33 Stat. 724, 15 U.S.C. §§ 81-134.
52. See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION § 5:4 (4th ed. 2004).
53. MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 2.2.
54. MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 5.3. Fanciful trademarks include words that are made
up or chosen solely for trademark purposes, and arbitrary trademarks are real words that have
no meaning as connected to the offered products or services. See MCCARTHY, supra note 52, at
§§ 11:5-14. In addition, personal names, names of corporations, and primarily geographical
terms were not protectable under the 1905 Act. Id
55. 15. U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
56. MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 4:12.
57. See Qualitex v. Jacobsen, 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1998) (noting that, “[s]ince human
beings might use as a ‘symbol’ or ‘device,’ almost anything at all that is capable of carrying
meaning, this language, read literally, is not restrictive”).
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Trademark Office (“USPTO”) has found permissible trademarks to include
certain spoken words (“WOO HOO!” for lottery services);58 certain distinc-
tive sounds (“the sound of methamphetamine which starts with the flick of a
lighter, followed by the fizzing sound of a small flame ignition, and high
pitched metallic crackling sounds”);59 and even live animals (“goats on a
roof of grass” for the rooftop of a restaurant).60 As such, the potential uni-
verse of protectable trademarks is limited only by human ingenuity and tech-
nology. Once a party establishes ownership in a protectable trademark, it can
enforce its trademark rights using a variety of vehicles.
1. Enforcing Trademark Rights Against Putative Infringers
State and federal law offer several causes of action based on the unau-
thorized use of trademarks. The two primary causes of action are trademark
infringement and trademark dilution.61 Though infringement and dilution
protect against different types of trademarks and activities, the remedies for
both include injunctive and monetary relief.
The first way to enforce trademark rights is through a cause of action for
trademark infringement. Trademark infringement exists where there is an
unsanctioned use of a trademark that “is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association”
of the putative infringer with the trademark’s owner.62 This “likelihood of
confusion” standard for trademark infringement applies to registered and un-
registered trademarks.63 Regarding trademarks that have been federally reg-
istered, the Lanham Act requires a determination of whether the putative
infringer’s conduct is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive.”64 For unregistered marks, the Lanham Act similarly asks whether
the putative infringer’s conduct “is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association” of the
putative infringer with the trademark owner.65 State law is generally consis-
tent with federal law in regards to standards for trademark infringement. In
fact, most courts faced with both federal and state law trademark infringe-
ment claims use a single likelihood of confusion analysis in assessing a puta-
tive infringer’s conduct.66
58. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 3,461,451 (filed Nov. 6, 2007).
59. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 3,582,216 (filed Aug. 30, 2007).
60. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 2,007,624 (filed Feb. 27, 1995).
61. Other common causes of action include unfair competition, false advertising, and
counterfeiting. See, e.g., Katja Weckstróm, Secondary Liability for Trademark Infringement in
the United States, 49 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 555, 579 (2011).
62. MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 23.1 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012)).
63. See id.
64. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2005)).
65. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012)).
66. See MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 23:1.50.
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The legal principle of confusion can take many forms, including point of
sale confusion, initial interest confusion, post-sale confusion, or confusion as
to affiliation, connection, or sponsorship.67 The confused party may be an
actual consumer, a potential consumer, or general member of the public who
has never purchased the relevant goods or services.68
The most common type of trademark confusion is point of sale confu-
sion, which occurs when a consumer is confused about the source of the
goods or services at the time that she makes the purchase.69 Initial interest
confusion, on the other hand, may afflict potential purchasers; this confusion
occurs when a putative infringer uses the “trademark in a manner calculated
to capture initial consumer attention, even though no actual sale is finally
completed as a result of the confusion.”70 Even non-purchasing members of
the general public can experience actionable trademark confusion through
post-sale confusion. In the seminal “post-sale confusion” case, Master-
crafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-LeCoultre Watches,
Inc., the defendant copied the trademark-protected appearance of a high-end
Atmos clock and sold it at a much cheaper price.71 In finding the defendant
liable for trademark infringement, the court noted that:
[S]ome customers would buy the . . . cheaper clock for the purpose
of acquiring the prestige gained by displaying what many visitors at
the customers’ homes would regard as a prestigious article. [The]
wrong thus consisted of the fact that such a visitor would be likely
to assume that the clock was an Atmos clock.72
Lastly, confusion as to affiliation, connection, or sponsorship illustrates the
broad reach of trademark enforcement. Oftentimes this type of confusion is
demonstrated by inquiring whether consumers believe permission is required
to use the trademark in question.73 Confusion as to affiliation, connection, or
67. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 52, §§ 23:5-8.
68. MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 23:5.
69. See id; see also Connie Davis Powell, We All Know It’s A Knock-Off! Re-Evaluat-
ing the Need for the Post-Sale Confusion Doctrine in Trademark Law, 14 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 1
(2012).
70. Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1144
(9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Comput. Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1018 (9th
Cir. 2004)).
71. 221 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1955).
72. Id. at 466.
73. Scholars have noted the “chicken and egg conundrum” of such a scenario
where,”[i]f consumers think that most uses of a trademark require authorization, then in fact
they will require authorization because the owner can enjoin consumer confusion caused by
unpermitted uses or charge for licenses. And if owners can sue to stop unauthorized uses, then
only authorized uses will be seen by consumers, creating or reinforcing their perception that
authorization is necessary.” MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 24:9.
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sponsorship may even apply in a situation where the trademark owner’s
product is no longer being manufactured.74
Once the type of confusion has been determined, jurisdictions apply
multi-factor tests designed to predict whether a likelihood of confusion ex-
ists.75  While each jurisdictional test has its own idiosyncrasies, the founda-
tional factors include:
(1) The degree of resemblance between the conflicting
designations,
(2) The similarity of the marketing methods and channels of
distribution,
(3) The characteristics of the prospective purchasers and the degree
of care they exercise,
(4) The degree of distinctiveness of the senior user’s mark,
(5) Where the goods or services are not competitive, the likelihood
that prospective buyers would expect the senior user to expand into
the field of the junior user,
(6) Where the goods or services are sold in different territories, the
extent to which the senior user’s designation is known in the junior
user’s territory,
(7) The intent of the junior user, and
(8) Evidence of actual confusion.76
These factors, however, are not to be applied in rigid mathematical fashion.
They are guidelines with highly factually specific application.77
Trademark infringement predicated on the theory of confusion also re-
quires that the putative infringer’s conduct be connected to the commercial
nature of goods or services. With respect to registered trademarks, the use
must cause a likelihood of confusion “in connection with the sale, offering
If consumers think that most uses of a trademark require authorization, then in fact
they will require authorization because the owner can enjoin consumer confusion
caused by unpermitted uses or charge for licenses. And if owners can sue to stop
unauthorized uses, then only authorized uses will be seen by consumers, creating or
reinforcing their perception that authorization is necessary.
MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 24:9.
74. See MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 23:8. In one popular case, the Sixth Circuit held
that the defendant’s unauthorized replicas of Ferrari’s Testarossa constituted trademark in-
fringement, even though Ferrari stopped producing the Testarossa after the 5000th car was
manufactured in 1984. Ferrari S.P.A. v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1238 (6th Cir. 1991).
75. See MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 24:28 (noting that most “tests have about eight
factors to consider and the number of factors varies slightly among the 13 federal circuits”).
76. MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 24:29 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COM-
PETITION §§ 20-23 (1995)).
77. MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 24:28.
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for sale, distribution or advertising of any goods or services.”78 For unregis-
tered trademarks, the use must be likely to cause confusion, mistake, or
deceive “as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person.”79
The second way to enforce trademark rights is through a cause of action
for trademark dilution. The concept of dilution is a separate basis of trade-
mark enforcement that is relatively new.80 The first federal law related to
trademark dilution was not enacted until 1996, and it was significantly modi-
fied in 2006.81 Trademark dilution is not based on consumer confusion, but
is instead designed to combat the weakening of a famous trademark’s ability
to identify and distinguish goods and services in the marketplace.
Dilution allows the owner of a famous trademark to enjoin unauthorized
commercial uses of that trademark, whether or not a likelihood of confusion
exists.82 Under federal law, the 2006 Trademark Dilution Revision Act
(“TDRA”) only extends dilution to so-called “famous” trademarks.83 A mark
is considered famous “if it is widely recognized by the general consuming
public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or ser-
vices of the mark’s owner.”84
Once it has been determined that a trademark is famous, the trademark
owner has two avenues to present a trademark dilution cause of action: dilu-
tion by blurring and dilution by tarnishment. Dilution by blurring destroys a
trademark owner’s rights in a trademark by obscuring “its product identifica-
tion or by damaging positive associations that have attached to it.”85 Dilution
by blurring claims are more common than dilution by tarnishment claims.86
78. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2012).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012).
80. Frank Schechter first proposed the concept of dilution in 1927. See MCCARTHY,
supra note 52, § 24:67.
81. MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 24:67. Before 1996, antidilution statutes were crea-
tures of state statutory law. Id.
82. Tcpip Holding Co. v. Haar Commc’ns Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2001).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012). Because of the myriad state-law standards related to
dilution, this Article will focus only on federal dilution law.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2012).
85. Ameritech, Inc. v. Am. Info. Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 965 (6th Cir. 1987).
86. See, e.g., Pfizer Inc. v. Sachs, 652 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (VIAGRA
trademark tarnished where defendant’s use consisted of creating a twenty-foot missile featur-
ing the VIAGRA trademark and parking it in Manhattan while women rode the missile and
distributed condoms); Coca-Cola Co. v. Alma-Leo U.S.A., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 725 (N.D. Ill.
1989) (dilution by tarnishment existed where a white candy powder that looked like cocaine
was sold in a bottle resembling the Coca-Cola bottle, which is protected by trademark law);
Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (dilution by
tarnishment found where defendant created and sold posters featuring the words ENJOY CO-
CAINE in Coca-Cola’s trademarked Spenserian script in red and white).
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Dilution by tarnishment occurs where a trademark is used without permis-
sion in a way that degrades and causes reputational harm to the trademark.87
The Lanham Act provides some guidance for determining whether dilu-
tion by blurring exists, but it does not provide the same guidance for a deter-
mination of dilution by tarnishment. Regarding dilution by blurring, courts
may assess all relevant factors, including the following:
(i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the
famous mark,
(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the fa-
mous mark,
(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging
in substantially exclusive use of the mark,
(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark,
(v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create
an association with the famous mark,
(vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade name and the
famous mark.88
Though there are no statutory guidelines with respect to tarnishment, courts
have noted that “[a] trademark may be tarnished when it is linked to prod-
ucts of shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory con-
text, with the result that the public will associate the lack of quality or lack
of prestige in the defendant’s goods with the plaintiff’s unrelated goods.”89
In addition, a trademark may also be tarnished “if the mark loses its ability
to serve as a ‘wholesome identifier’” of the trademark owner’s goods or
services.90 Finally, certain forms of trademark utilization, including fair use,
news reporting and commentary, and noncommercial uses, are not actiona-
ble under either theory of dilution.91
2. Remedies Available Against Proven Infringers
The structure of trademark remedies allows for injunctive relief and
monetary recovery, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case.
Successful trademark owners are typically awarded injunctive relief to elimi-
nate infringement and/or dilutive conduct.92 Monetary relief for trademark
87. See id.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2012).
89. Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996) (quot-
ing Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994)).
90. Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 110 (2d Cir. 2009).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2012).
92. Overview of Trademark Law, BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY AT
HARVARD UNIVERSITY, https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/metaschool/fisher/domain/tm.htm#11
(last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
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infringement under the Lanham Act is cumulative and includes profits, dam-
ages, reasonable attorney fees in “exceptional cases,” and costs.93 Histori-
cally, however, monetary remedies have been rare.94 In trademark dilution
suits, damages are permissible only in cases where the infringer “willfully
intended” to trade on the recognition of the famous mark (in the instance of
dilution by blurring) or to harm the reputation of the famous mark (in the
instance of dilution by tarnishment).95
Permanent injunctive relief is the most common remedy in trademark
infringement and dilution suits. Monetary relief is generally considered inad-
equate, primarily because reputational and good will-related harm is not
compensable.96 The scope of injunctive relief must be tailored to fit the facts
and circumstances of the case.97 Courts consider, at minimum, “the manner
in which the [trademark owner] is harmed, the possible means by which the
harm can be avoided, the justification advanced for the [infringer’s] conduct,
the potential burden that would be imposed on the legitimate interests of the
[trademark owner], and the potential effect upon lawful competition between
the parties.”98 The First Amendment may also be relevant under certain cir-
cumstances, as speech-based restrictions may infringe upon the right of free
expression.99
C. Contemporary Use of Trademarks as Tattoos in the United States
In contrast to the pre-American Civil War period, parties who perma-
nently place trademarks on their bodies now generally do so based on their
own free will and not because a slave owner has forced them to.100 Some
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2012). Under certain extenuating circumstances, treble damages
may also be awarded. Id.
94. See Andrew W. Carter & Gregory M. Remec, Monetary Awards for Trademark
Infringement under the Lanham Act, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 464 (1996). For example, from the
period between 1946 and 1995, monetary relief was only granted in 125 cases. Id. at 465.  One
scholar has even gone as far to note that “[t]he Lanham Act’s monetary relief rules are an
abject failure.” Mark A. Thurmon, Federal Trademark Remedies: A Proposal for Reform, 5
AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 137, 138 (2011).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). State statutes rarely provide for the collection of monetary
damages in dilution actions. Trademark Dilution, BITLAW, http://www.bitlaw.com/trade-
mark/dilution.html (last visited April 25, 2016).
96. See MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 30:1 (comparing damages for reputational harm to
trying to “un-ring a bell”).
97. MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 30:3.
98. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 35 cmt. c (1995).
99. Id. (“Although market participants do not have a constitutional right to engage in
deceptive or confusing commercial speech, restrictions on speech that extend beyond those
reasonably necessary to prevent the wrongful conduct may infringe on protected rights.”).
100. But see Mia De Graff, The return of slave-branding, DAILY MAIL (Sept. 6, 2015,
10:09 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3224738/Modern-day-sex-traffickers-
bringing-branding-used-slaves-having-names-insignia-tattooed-victims-mark-property.html
(noting that “[m]odern-day sex traffickers are . . . [forcing girls] to get a tattoo of their pimp’s
name or insignia to mark them out as his ‘property’”).
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people get trademark tattoos because they are paid for skinvertising, while
others are merely unpaid brand enthusiasts.
Skinvertisements became popular during the dotcom era of the early
2000s.101 The first such instance of “skinvertising” involved a man named
Jim Nelson selling space on the back of his head to CI Host, a now-defunct
web hosting company.102 A few years later, a single mother in Utah sold the
space on her forehead to GoldenPalace.com in exchange for $10,000.103
Other individuals, like Billy Gibby104 and Joe Tamargo,105 have allegedly
made hundreds of thousands of dollars auctioning off their skin to potential
skinvertisers. The dotcom skinvertisement boom eventually died in the late
2000s (along with many of the dotcom companies who paid for such
skinvertisements) and has all but fallen into obscurity.106
There may, however, be a burgeoning renaissance among trademark tat-
toos through professional sports and athletes. Beyond the realm of dotcom
skinvertisements, sports-related skinvertising has been likened to ambush
marketing, where “companies attempt to make the consumer think their
product or service is somehow affiliated with a popular sporting event or
league.”107 The purpose of such marketing is to take advantage of large-scale
viewership without going through the bureaucracy of obtaining permission
from the sports league or other organizers.108 Ambush marketing also dimin-
ishes a company’s willingness to spend large sums of money on advertise-
ment and sponsor fees when it can obtain similar results through
skinvertising at a lower cost.109
Professional sports leagues have taken a wide variety of approaches to
such athlete endorsements. In 2001, the boxing industry was faced with the
question of whether to allow boxers to wear temporary tattoos during
matches.110 The first instance came when Bernard Hopkins was paid roughly
101. Guarini, supra note 9.
102. Past their sell by dates: Meet the people branded for life with tattoos advertising
websites that no longer exist, DAILY MAIL (Sept. 27, 2012, 12:19 AM), http://www.dailymail
.co.uk/news/article-2209233/The-body-billboard-The-people-dotcom-tattoos-advertising-web
sites-longer-exist.html.
103. Guarini, supra note 9.
104. Id. (noting that Gibby’s website offered prices for advertising on his body through
permanent tattoos).
105. See Past their sell by dates, supra note 102.
106. Some enterprising entrepreneurs still auction off skin space for advertisement pur-
poses. See, e.g., Joe Lawler, Professional wrestler inks deal with Lucky Gal Tattoo, DES
MOINES REGISTER (Nov. 1, 2013), http://archive.desmoinesregister.com/article/20131101/
NEWS/311010056/Professional-wrestler-inks-deal-Lucky-Gal-Tattoo.
107. John Vukelj, Post No Bills: Can the NBA Prohibit Its Players from Wearing Tattoo
Advertisements?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 507, 518 (2005).
108. Id.
109. Patrick Donohue Sheridan, An Olympic Solution to Ambush Marketing: How the
London Olympics Show the Way to More Effective Trademark Law, 17 SPORTS LAW J. 27, 28
(2010).
110. See Vukelj, supra note 107, at 509.
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$100,000 by GoldenPalace.com to wear a temporary tattoo across his back
during a boxing match.111 This display was, from a business perspective, a
wildly successful marketing effort—many news outlets devoted a large
amount of screen time to the appropriateness of skinvertising.112 The Nevada
Athletic Commission (“NAC”), however, disagreed and banned skinvertise-
ments on boxers.113 The following year, the NAC was sued by Clarence
Adams, who wanted to wear a similar GoldenPalace.com tattoo.114 Adams
was ultimately granted a preliminary injunction by the Clark County District
Court, which apparently noted that “the ban was a violation of the boxers’
First Amendment rights and therefore could not be enforced.”115 Thereafter,
Todd Bridges, Danny Bonaduce, and Tonya Harding wore
GoldenPalace.com tattoos during Celebrity Boxing, a television show on the
Fox network.116 Both ESPN and Fox Sports were displeased by
GoldenPalace.com’s circumventing the payment of advertisement and spon-
sorship fees, and both eventually banned skinvertising.117
Most notably, the National Basketball Association (“NBA”) has taken
affirmative steps to prohibit skinvertising, even though no player to date has
affirmatively obtained a tattoo for the express purpose of skinvertising.118
The NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement states that “a player may not,
during any NBA game, display any commercial, promotional, or charitable
name, mark, logo or other identification, including but not limited to on his
body, in his hair, or otherwise.”119 NBA players, therefore, are expressly
prohibited from wearing skinvertisements during games.
NBA players have already experienced the commercial implications of
bearing trademark tattoos.120 In 2009, Marcin Gortat, a NBA player for the
111. Hilary Cassidy, Roll (Dice) with the Punches: When an Online Casino Sends a
Fighter into the Ring with its Ad Tattooed on His Back, He Upsets His Opponents, the Boxing
Community and ESPN, BRANDWEEK, Dec. 9. 2002, at 22.
112. Zachary Crockett, How An Illegal Gambling Website Became The King Of Market-
ing, PRICEONOMICS (Nov. 18, 2014), http://priceonomics.com/the-rogue-marketing-of-golden
palacecom/.
113. Id.
114. Vukelj, supra note 107, at 511-12. The NAC gave three reasons for the decision to
ban skinvertisements: “(1) that the tattoos could distract judges; (2) that the ink might get into
the opponent’s eyes; and (3) that tattoo advertisements are demeaning to the sport of boxing.”
Id.
115. Id. at 512.
116. Id. at 513 (noting that more than “fifteen million viewers in the United States saw
the program on Fox, and visitors to the GoldenPalace.com web site reportedly rose 200% in
the twenty-four hour period following the show”).
117. Id.
118. Players have, of course, obtained tattoos for purposes of brand loyalty. See infra,
notes 121-125 and accompanying text.
119. National Basketball Association Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. XXXVII,
§ 3(b) (Dec. 2011) (emphasis added), http://nbpa.com/cba/.
120. More than half of all NBA players have visible tattoos. See Mike Wilson, What
Ethan Swan Learned From Tracking Every Tattoo in the NBA, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 6,
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Orlando Magic, famously made headlines because of the Nike Jumpman tat-
too that appears on his lower right leg.121 According to some reports, Reebok
International Ltd., a sportswear company, signed Gortat to an endorsement
deal presumably without knowing that he had the Jumpman tattoo.122 Shortly
thereafter, Gortat’s photo appeared in a Polish newspaper with the tattoo
prominently displayed.123 Reebok asked Gortat to cover the tattoo during
basketball games, but he refused to do so and was dropped by Reebok.124
Amidst these reports, Reebok claimed no official contract was ever signed,
and that Reebok would stop providing Gortat with free shoes and no longer
pursue an endorsement deal.125
On the other hand, tattoos featuring corporate logos are also obtained by
people with no commercial interest in acquiring them.126 Scholars have sug-
gested that such tattoos extend beyond the realm of a few brand enthusiasts
at the fringes of society and into sociocultural indications of group member-
ship.127 In the United States, popular trademark tattoos seem to depend upon
geographical boundaries.128 Specifically related to the West Coast, the seem-
2014), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-ethan-swan-learned-from-tracking-every-tat-
too-in-the-nba/.
121. J.E. Skeets, Reebok asks Magic center Gortat to cover Jordan tattoo, YAHOO!
SPORTS: BALL DON’T LIE (June 9, 2009), http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/blog/ball_dont_lie/post/
Reebok-asks-Magic-center-Gortat-to-cover-Jordan-?urn=nba,169109. The Jumpman logo is
owned by Nike and features Michael Jordan’s silhouette dunking a basketball. See Darren
Rovell, Nike sued over Michael Jordan logo, ESPN (Jan. 23, 2015), http://espn.go.com/nba/
story/_/id/12218091/photographer-sues-nike-michael-jordan-photo-
122. See Skeets, supra note 121.
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Tania Ganguli, Marcin Gortat’s ink puts black mark on Reebok deal, OR-
LANDO SENTINEL (July 29, 2009), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2009-07-29/sports/
gortat_1_reebok-gortat-air-jordan.
126. See Jamie Shelden & Mary DeLongis, Tattoo You–With A Trademark, INTABULLE-
TIN (July 1, 2001), http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/TattooYou%E2%80%93WithA
Trademark.aspx. Interestingly, however, tattoo artists seem to exist in a bifurcated universe
where copying pre-designed tattoo designs (called “flash”) is acceptable, while the copying of
custom designs is considered taboo. See Perzanowski, supra note 14, at 541-57. Trademark
tattoos would seem to fall into the former category, absent directions from a client to create a
more creative rendering of the trademark.
127. See Shelden & DeLongis, supra note 126 (“It seems that the trademarks that are
most frequently seen as tattoos tend to be those that have achieved a certain cultural impact;
ones that have become, for their admirers, a way of life.”).
128. See id. Obtaining a trademark tattoo also depends upon the willingness of a tattoo
artist to complete such a tattoo. The question of whether providing trademark tattoos is legal is
in the forefront of the minds of some tattoo artists. See id. (noting that “one tattoo artist indi-
cated that he refuses to reproduce trademarks as tattoos because of concerns about infringe-
ment.”). In an interview about the intellectual property ramifications of providing trademark
tattoos, another tattoo artist stated that he had considered the consequences, noting,
[I]t is impossible to regulate . . . . [s]o many people have tattoos of protected art, he
said, that there is simply nothing . . . trademark owners can do about it. Specifically,
he mentioned Hello Kitty’s popular Japanese bobtail cat, explaining that it is a very
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ingly most popular trademark tattoos in the United States are those related to
the Harley-Davidson brand, including the famous eagle with outstretched
wings.129 This has been attributed to Harley-Davidson’s marketing strategy
of social branding.130 The second-most popular trademark tattoos belong to
followers of the band The Grateful Dead.131 “Deadheads,” as they are affec-
tionately christened, commonly obtain “the [trademark] THE GRATEFUL
DEAD, [and] other marks associated with the band, such as the Dancing
Bears logo and Skull design mark, and countless variations of these de-
signs.”132 Tattoo artists have stated that other popular trademark tattoos in-
clude logos from National Football League teams, the NASCAR logo, and
collegiate sports designs and logos.133 On the East Coast, the most popular
trademark tattoo is the New York Yankees baseball team YANKEES
logo.134 In Northeastern states, other popular trademark tattoos include Har-
ley-Davidson-related logos, the CHEVY CAMARO logo, and the NIKE
swoosh.135 In New York specifically, celebrity portraits, Budweiser cans,
and Corona beer bottles are also popular tattoo selections.136
Tattoos obtained for noncommercial purposes may develop trademark
qualities and/or commercial value with a rise in popularity or visibility of the
tattooed individual.  For example, the tattoos of one of the NBA’s early tat-
too enthusiasts, Dennis Rodman, formed the basis of a 1996 lawsuit.137 Rod-
man obtained his roughly 100 tattoos based upon his personal preferences
common tattoo among young women. Presumably, none of those young women
asked for (or asked their tattoo artist to request) permission from Hello Kitty’s par-
ent company, Sanrio. For his part, [the tattoo artist] explained that he averages about
three to five tattoos a day and estimates that he tattoos a sports logo about once
every three months. He related that there are tattoo fads that ebb and flow, like
particular sports logos or movie or television characters that are popular for a short
time. For example, when the Los Angeles Lakers won their second consecutive
NBA championship in June 2010, [the tattoo artist] said he noticed an increase in
requests for Lakers logos.
Beasley, supra note 25, at 1160-61.
129. See Shelden & DeLongis, supra note 126.
130. See Baskin, supra note 12 (noting that “H-D was a social brand long before we ever
had a name for it, selling emotive themes and a lifestyle to a generation of Americans who
yearned for safe rebellion and the promise of the open road.”).




135. See id. In addition, following Dale Earnhardt’s untimely death, tattoos encompass-
ing the number “3” and Earnhardt’s signature skyrocketed in popularity. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Dennis Rodman v. Fanatix Apparel, Inc., Case No. 96-2103 (D.N.J., May 28,
1996). Though tattoos are commonplace in the NBA today, Dennis Rodman was one of the
first NBA players to don large numbers of tattoos. See Harry Cheadle, A Brief History of
Tattoos in the NBA, VICE, May 17, 2011, http://www.vice.com/read/a-brief-history-of-tattoos-
in-the-nba (calling Rodman a “tattoo pioneer in the [NBA]).
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and life experiences, and was as well known for his tattoos as he was for his
prowess on the basketball court.138 At the height of Rodman’s fame as an
NBA player, Fanatix Apparel began making unauthorized t-shirts with re-
productions of Rodman’s tattoos positioned in the same physical locations as
found on Rodman’s body.139 These shirts were sold as Fanatix’s “Dennis
Rodman Tattoo Shirt.”140 In seeking a preliminary injunction from the dis-
trict court, Rodman alleged, among other things, that his tattoos were pro-
tectable as unregistered trademarks and that the defendant’s activities would
cause a likelihood of confusion as to source and sponsorship.141 The court
granted the preliminary injunction and enjoined Fanatix from further mak-
ing, selling or advertising the shirts.142
Once considered the wares of “sailors, convicts, and circus perform-
ers,”143 tattoos have become commonplace in the United States. The increas-
ing ubiquity of tattoos in American culture, and the rise of trademark tattoos,
has given rise to unique legal questions that will be addressed in the remain-
der of this Article.
II. ENFORCING TRADEMARK RIGHTS AGAINST PARTIES
WITH TRADEMARK TATTOOS
A person with a trademark tattoo may, like Sam Penix of Everyman
Espresso, eventually finds him or herself at odds with the owner of the trade-
mark or others. State and federal trademark law allow trademark owners to
preclude others from using their trademarks in commerce under certain cir-
cumstances. Such enforcement claims may be subject to several viable de-
fenses. If, however, those claims are successful, the primary remedy for
infringement is to enjoin the infringing conduct, which could have far-reach-
ing implications for tattooed parties. The discussion below analyzes trade-
mark enforcement mechanisms and the remedies available to trademark
owners when dealing with allegedly infringing trademark tattoos.
A. Enforcing Trademark Rights
Once a trademark owner learns that a putative infringer has obtained a
permanent tattoo embodying the trademark owner’s valid, protectable trade-
mark, nothing in current trademark law precludes the trademark owner from
enforcing her trademark rights against the tattooed party. This enforcement
138. DENNIS RODMAN & JACK ISENHOUR, I SHOULD BE DEAD BY NOW 18 (2006) (noting
that his roughly 100 tattoos tell his life story).
139. Rodman, Case No. 96-2103, at *4.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 3 AARON WISE & BRUCE MEYER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW AND BUSINESS
(1997).
143. See Perzanowski, supra note 14, at 512.
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would likely take the form of a claim for trademark infringement or trade-
mark dilution.
1. Proving Trademark Infringement Against a Party
With a Trademark Tattoo
Assuming that the trademark owner has a valid, protectable trademark,
the remaining steps in proving an infringement claim are showing that the
tattooed party is using a “reproduction, . . . copy, or colorable imitation” of
the trademark (the first requirement) in commerce without permission (the
second requirement) and that such use is likely to cause confusion (the third
requirement).144
The first requirement, which requires a reproduction, copy, or colorable
imitation, will arguably be met in most instances. In cases of skinvertising,
the tattooed party will almost necessarily get a tattoo recognizable as the
relevant trademark. With regard to brand enthusiasts, if the goal is to convey
support or loyalty to a particular brand, the trademark tattoo will likely en-
compass a copy or imitation.145
With respect to the second requirement, unauthorized use in commerce,
athletes, entertainers, and other public figures are most at risk of falling
within the ambit of the requisite use in commerce. By virtue of their careers,
these figures are regularly in the public eye, using their physical appearance,
skills, and bodies to market themselves and the goods and services con-
nected to their livelihoods. Athletes in particular may be the most suscepti-
ble because athlete endorsement has become a lucrative marketing strategy
for many companies.146 Indeed, marketing companies have approached ath-
letes in recent years regarding temporary skinvertisements, only to be shut
down by sports leagues.147
Private individuals may also find themselves using trademark tattoos in
commerce through photos and marketing materials related to their own com-
panies, similar to Mr. Penix of Everyday Espresso.148 On the other hand,
some people may escape liability if they merely adorn their trademark tat-
toos and never appear in commercial photos or videos, engage in paid public
144. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 259 (4th
Cir. 2007) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2012); CareFirst of Md., Inc. v. First Care, P.C., 434
F.3d 263, 267 (2006)).
145. The statutory language does not require that the allegedly infringing trademark be
identical. Thus, trademark tattoos using artistic derivations from the original trademark may
still be infringing. Indeed, Mr. Penix’s “I [coffee cup] NY” tattoo was not identical to the I ♥
NY trademark owned by the State of New York, and the state still accused him of trademark
infringement. See Newman, supra note 1.
146. See Julie Stevens et al., “Who is Your Hero?” Implications for Athlete Endorsement
Strategies, 12 SPORT MARKETING Q. 103 (2003).
147. See Vukelj, supra note 107, at 513-14.
148. But see Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 20, at 123-24 (suggesting that merely having
a trademark tattoo does not infringe).
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performances, or attempt to pursue any career where their appearance and
tattoo(s) are relevant or visible. Increasingly, however, the Internet and so-
cial media have made nearly ever multimedia opportunity a potentially com-
mercial endeavor. For example, Instagram, a social networking site, has
become a place for its users, especially Millennials, to make large amounts
of money sharing photos and videos featuring seemingly mundane tasks.149
Companies spend more than $1 billion per year on sponsored Instagram
posts commissioned from Instagram “influencers” with large followings.150
Social media allows otherwise unknown individuals to become “micro-ce-
lebrities” among large numbers of followers.151 As such, it is easy to imagine
scenarios where private individuals will use their trademark tattoos in com-
merce within the ambit of trademark law.
The third and final requirement for finding trademark infringement,
whether there exists a likelihood of confusion, poses significant challenges
for individuals with trademark tattoos because of the many forms confusion
can take.152 A likelihood of confusion analysis in the trademark tattoo uni-
verse would likely be based on initial interest confusion, post-sale confusion,
or confusion as to affiliation, connection, or sponsorship.
Initial interest confusion is based on “initial customer interest,” even if
the customer ultimately does not purchase the object of her confusion.153
One line of cases suggests that people with trademark tattoos could be found
liable under such a theory.
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp.,154 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld a finding of trademark infringement even where a
likelihood of confusion only existed briefly at the outset of a transaction.
Mobil had used a trademark symbol encompassing a winged horse since
1931, which represented the Greek mythological creature named Pegasus, in
its gasoline and petroleum business.155 At the time of the litigation, the court
recognized that Mobil’s winged horse trademark was one of the strongest
trademarks in American commerce.156 In 1981, the defendant entered the
149. See Kayleen Schaefer, How Bloggers Make Money on Instagram, HARPER’S BA-
ZAAR (May 20, 2015), http://www.harpersbazaar.com/fashion/trends/a10949/how-bloggers-
make-money-on-instagram/ (interviewing a 22-year-old blogger with 992,000 Instagram fol-
lowers who charges between $5,000 and $15,000 for one sponsored photo or video post on
Instagram).
150. See id.
151. See generally Alice Marwick, Status update: Celebrity, Publicity and Self-branding
in Web 2.0 (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) (on file with
author).
152. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
153. MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 23.6.
154. 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987).
155. Id. at 255. As part of their business activities, Mobil participated in the oil trading
market. Id. at 256. “The oil trading market is tight-knit and sophisticated . . . [O]il traders do
not consummate deals with strangers except after a thorough credit check.” Id.
156. Id. at 255-56.
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private oil trading market under the name Pegasus Petroleum.157 The com-
pany’s founder, Gregory Callimanopulous, had chosen the name “because he
wanted a name with both mythical connotations and alliterative qualities.”158
The Second Circuit agreed with the district court judge’s assertion that a
likelihood of confusion was based on “the likelihood that that Pegasus Petro-
leum would gain crucial credibility during the initial phases of a deal.”159 It
further noted that this initial interest confusion could form the basis of a
trademark infringement lawsuit.160 In the trademark tattoo context, this type
of analysis leaves open the potential for liability if consumers initially be-
lieve that a party with the tattoo is providing any services of the trademark
owner.161
Consider an application of this legal framework to the case of Sam
Penix and his coffee shop, Everyman Espresso.  The State of New York’s
trademark infringement claim against Sam Penix may have been based on
initial interest confusion. A consumer seeing the Everyman Espresso logo on
signage may initially be interested in the coffee shop based on the belief that
it is owned by the trademark owner (the State of New York) and thus more
authentic or special. Even if that consumer did not ultimately purchase cof-
fee from the coffee shop, confusion has happened.
Even more likely than initial interest confusion is an infringement claim
based on confusion as to affiliation, connection, or sponsorship. If consum-
ers are confused into believing that the trademark owner approved of the
trademark tattoo in some way, this could expose the tattooed party to in-
fringement liability.162 In such cases, the appropriate legal question “is
whether the average purchaser would be likely to believe that the infringer’s
product has ‘some connection’ with the trademark owner.”163 Given the era
of dotcom skinvertisements, tattoo-based ambush marketing in boxing and
the NBA, and other types of body billboard opportunities, it is clear that
some companies do, indeed, approve of trademark tattoos for such pur-
157. Id.
158. Id. He also said that, though he was aware of Mobil’s trademark, he was unaware
that the term Pegasus was represented by a flying horse.
159. Id. at 259 (“[A]n oil trader might listen to a cold phone call from Pegasus Petro-
leum—an admittedly oft used procedure in the oil trading business—when otherwise he might
not, because of the possibility that Pegasus Petroleum is related to Mobil.”).
160. Id. at 260.
161. This would be more relevant with regard to services, not goods. Absent the return of
slavery, the party baring the tattoo would not be the “good” of the trademark owner.
162. See Homeowners Grp., Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1107
(6th Cir. 1991) (noting that the ultimate question is whether consumers are likely to believe
that the parties’ offerings are affiliated in some way).
163. See Ferrari S.p.A. Esercizio Fabbriche Automobili e Corse v. McBurnie, No. 86-
1812-B(IEG), 1989 WL 298658, at *5 (S.D. Cal. June 1, 1989) (quoting Grey v. Campbell
Soup Co., 650 F.Supp. 1166, 1173 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (noting that a customer purchasing unau-
thorized manufacturing kits or completed cars looking like a Ferrari “might not know if Ferrari
has sponsored, approved, or licensed” those items)).
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poses.164 It is not beyond the realm of possibilities, therefore, that consumers
would believe that a trademark tattoo has been authorized in some way.
Some cases also suggest that the tattoo artist may be liable for trademark
infringement under a theory of confusion based on affiliation, connection, or
sponsorship. In Boston Professional Hockey Ass’n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap &
Emblem Manufacturing, Inc., the National Hockey League and thirteen NHL
teams (collectively “NHL”) sued Dallas Cap & Emblem Manufacturing, Inc.
(“Dallas Cap”) for trademark infringement stemming from Dallas Cap’s
manufacture and sale of embroidered NHL patches.165 The NHL owned
trademark rights in the logos embodied by the patches.166 The court strug-
gled with the fact that the “reproduction of the trademark [was] being sold
unattached to any other goods or services, [because] [t]he statutory and case
law of trademarks is oriented toward the use of such marks to sell something
other than the mark itself.”167 The court ultimately found this activity in-
fringing in part because the trademark owners had worked hard to build
goodwill in the trademarks, and the commercial value of Dallas Cap’s
patches stemmed from those efforts.168 Using such a rationale, a tattoo artist
selling and inking trademark tattoos unconnected to other products could be
subject to trademark infringement liability.169
Post-sale confusion could also exist with regard to trademark tattoos.
Post-sale confusion would occur where observers view a trademark tattoo
and become confused regarding whether the party with the tattoo provides
services offered by the trademark owner.170 In Acad. of Motion Picture Arts
& Sciences v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., the Ninth Circuit considered
the issue and found infringement in another context—replicas of the golden
“Oscar” statuette—and noted that, while purchasers of the infringing statu-
164. See, e.g., GoldenPalace.com featured on MSNBC’s Countdown, GOLDENPALACE
EVENTS.COM, http://www.goldenpalaceevents.com/auctions/msnbc01.php (“[P]ermanent and
semi-permanent tattoos of [GoldenPalace.com have appeared] in such places as foreheads,
legs, the bellies of pregnant women and the chest of [a] former swimsuit model.”).
165. Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n  v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg. Inc., 510 F.2d 1004,
1008 (5th Cir. 1975).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1010.
168. Id. at 1011. The court was hesitant, however, to encourage a broad reading of its
holding, noting that it was not addressing “whether every artistic reproduction of the symbol
would infringe. . . .” The court restricted itself “to the emblems sold principally through sport-
ing goods stores for informal use by the public in connection with sports activities and to show
public allegiance to or identification with the teams themselves.” Id. In fact, in a later case, the
same court distinguished its holding as applied to fraternal jewelry. See Supreme Assembly,
Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J. H. Ray Jewelry Co., 676 F.2d 1079, 1085 (5th Cir. 1982) (“It
is not unreasonable to conclude . . . that a consumer seeing the emblem or name of a team on
or associated with a good or service would assume some sort of sponsorship or association
between the product’s seller and the team.”).
169. Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 20, at 127.
170. See Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Creative House Promotions, Inc.,
944 F.2d 1446, 1455 (9th Cir. 1991).
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ette would know that it was not an Oscar given by the Academy of Motion
Picture Arts & Sciences, a secondary audience could see the replica and
believe that it was associated with the real Oscar.171 Other courts have noted
that trademark law is designed to protect post-sale observers of products
featuring infringing trademarks, not just those who purchase goods and
services.172
Considering the many types of confusion, a tattooed party could find
themselves liable under several theories, including initial interest confusion,
confusion as to affiliation, connection, or sponsorship, or post-sale
confusion.
Once the type of confusion has been identified, the next step will be to
apply the likelihood of confusion factors to the specific circumstances.173
Though no court has yet considered whether a trademark tattoo is infringing,
a hypothetical analysis can be based on Everyman Espresso’s former logo
featuring Sam Penix’s “I [coffee cup] NY” tattoo.
In the Second Circuit, the likelihood of confusion factors are:
(1) The strength of the plaintiff’s mark,
(2) The similarity of plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks,
(3) The competitive proximity of the products,
(4) The likelihood that plaintiff will “bridge the gap” and offer a
product like defendant’s,
(5) Actual confusion between products,
(6) Good faith on the defendant’s part,
(7) The quality of defendant’s product, and
(8) The sophistication of buyers.174
171. Id.
172. See Ferrari S.P.A. v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1245 (6th Cir. 1991) (The court ruled
that protection of automobile manufacturer from confusion of source resulting from defen-
dant’s manufacture of replicas was not limited to confusion at point of sale)
173. Each Circuit has its own approach to the likelihood of confusion analysis. See, e.g.,
S. Co. v. Dauben Inc., 324 F. App’x 309 (5th Cir. 2009); Borinquen Biscuit Corp. v. M.V.
Trading Corp., 443 F.3d 112 (1st Cir. 2006); Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964
(10th Cir. 2002); Barbecue Max, Inc. v. 551 Ogden, Inc., 235 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 2000);
Champagne Louis Roederer, S.A. v. Delicato Vineyards, 148 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community College District, 889 F.2d 1018 (11th Cir. 1989); Wynn
Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1988); Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d
1522 (4th Cir. 1984); Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460 (3d Cir. 1983); SquirtCo. v.
Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086 (8th Cir. 1980); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341
(9th Cir. 1979); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
174. Fed. Exp. Corp. v. Fed. Espresso, Inc., 201 F.3d 168, 171 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 820, 82 S.Ct. 36, 7 L.Ed.2d 25 (1961)).
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Regarding the strength of the plaintiff’s mark, “I ♥ NY” is a strong and
well-known trademark. Products featuring the slogan are visible all over
New York City.175 It is one of the most widely distributed images in the
world and is even featured in the Museum of Modern Art.176 As such, the
strength of the plaintiff’s “I ♥ NY” trademark weighs in favor of
infringement.
The similarity of “I ♥ NY” to Everyman Espresso’s logo is a more diffi-
cult analysis. Conflicting trademarks utilizing both words and designs must
be considered in their entirety.177 Here, it is critical to determine whether
words or design elements dominate the trademark.178 Most courts have held
that the word portion dominates.179 When comparing trademarks, one must
“consider not only the similarity of the accused word marks, but also the
similarity of the lettering style, color and format and any accompanying
background matter.”180 In addition, both the Supreme Court and the USPTO
have noted that adding matter to protectable trademarks is generally insuffi-
cient to avoid infringement liability.181 Penix’s trademark tattoo uses stylized
lettering for “I” and “NY” identical to the State of New York’s mark. The
primary difference is the replacement of the red heart symbol with a red
coffee cup, but the words likely dominate the design. Also, the additional
matter, including the coffee portafilter and the words EVERYMAN
ESPRESSO, do not eliminate liability. This leans in favor of infringement in
regards to the similarity factor.182
Regarding the competitive proximity of the products, the State of New
York owns nearly twenty federal trademark registrations for derivations of
“I ♥ NY,” from key chains, clothing, and magnets to plush toys and per-
fume.183 It also owns a registration for enhancing the state’s economic devel-
opment and promoting tourism.184 Everyman Espresso, on the other hand,
175. See Ramirez, supra note 4.
176. Gabe Pressman, “I Love NY”: The Doodle That Became an Icon, NBCNEWYORK
.COM (May 31, 2012), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/The-Doodle-That-Became-an-
Icon-156019055.html.
177. See King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1090-91
(10th Cir. 1999).
178. See, e.g., The Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Pitts, 107
U.S.P.Q.2d 2001, 2023 (T.T.A.B. 2013) (“When a composite mark contains both words and a
design, the word portion is more likely to be impressed upon a purchaser’s memory and to be
used when requesting the goods and services.”).
179. Id.
180. MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 23:52.
181. Id. § 23:50 (noting that, as a general rule, additions to protected trademarks do not
eliminate infringement liability).
182. See Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1988) (af-
firming a finding of infringement where “the similarity of typefaces-each using a Roman letter
design for the label-exacerbates the like impression created by the two labels”).
183. See, e.g., I NY, Registration No. 4,267,307; I NY, Registration No. 4,254,793; I
NY, Registration No. 4,106,575.
184. See, e.g., I NY, Registration No. 4,224,966.
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was ostensibly only using its logo to provide restaurant services, more spe-
cifically coffee shop services.185 While offering coffee-related services may
promote economic development and promote tourism, the competitive prox-
imity of the products seemingly weighs against a finding of trademark
infringement.186
With respect to Everyman Espresso’s good faith, “actual or constructive
knowledge” of the trademark owner’s mark can be used to show bad faith.187
While the Lanham Act does provide a defense based on innocent infringe-
ment, it is limited to printers and publishers.188 Of course, Penix knew about
the “I ♥ NY” trademark but it is not clear whether he intended to capitalize
on the reputation and goodwill built in the trademark. He is most likely a
brand enthusiast who did not set out to infringe when he obtained the tat-
too.189 However, placing a stylized representation of Penix’s tattoo in the
company’s logo adds a level of complexity to the analysis. What is more, the
State of New York has admitted that there is widespread infringement of the
“I ♥ NY” trademark on the city streets by individuals and companies who
may not know that the designation is trademarked.190 The resulting impact of
Penix’s good faith is difficult to predict.
Regarding the sophistication of the relevant consumers, the likelihood of
confusion is reduced when the consumers are sophisticated parties.191 Low
consumer sophistication means that such parties are less discriminating and
more likely to be confused when encountering allegedly infringing trade-
marks. The relevant inquiry “considers the general impression of the ordi-
nary purchaser, buying under the normally prevalent conditions of the
market and giving the attention such purchasers usually give in buying that
class of goods.”192 Anyone passing by Everyman Espresso could be a con-
sumer, and courts have noted that buyer sophistication is generally low when
185. It is unclear, however, if Everyman Espresso was also selling merchandise featuring
the logo in its shop
186. If, however, the State of New York has rights in an unregistered “I ♥ NY” trade-
mark related to restaurant or coffee shop services, this factor may indeed also weigh in favor
of a finding of infringement.
187. Info. Superhighway, Inc. v. Talk Am., Inc., 395 F. Supp. 2d 44, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 1987).
188. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2) (2012). Innocent infringement remains a confusing princi-
ple for courts. Legislative history suggests a publisher or broadcaster is “innocent” only if it
“knew that [an] advertisement was false or infringing or proceeded to publish the advertise-
ment with ‘reckless disregard’ as to whether it was false or infringing or not.” MCCARTHY,
supra note 52, § 25:29. Other jurisdictions, like the Fifth Circuit, have found that the term
“innocent” is measured by the standard of objective reasonableness. Id. (citing Dial One of the
Mid-South, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 269 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2001)).
189. Indeed, Penix commented that he wanted Everyman Espresso to display “an in-
your-face passion for New York City.” See Newman, supra note 1.
190. See Ramirez, supra note 4.
191. Morningside Grp. Ltd. v. Morningside Capital Grp., L.L.C., 182 F.3d 133, 142 (2d
Cir. 1999).
192. McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1137 (2d Cir. 1979).
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related to basic food and beverage purchases.193 Because buyer sophistica-
tion is relatively low, this weighs in favor of a finding of trademark
infringement.
There are not enough available facts to determine whether the State of
New York will “bridge the gap” and enter the restaurant and/or coffee shop
space, but it is plausible that the state, which owns trademarks directed to
tourism and economic development, could enter into commercial transac-
tions dealing with food and beverages. Nevertheless, courts can find a likeli-
hood of confusion even where there is no evidence that a trademark owner
plans to bridge the gap.194 There are also not enough facts to determine the
quality of Everyman Espresso’s products,195 or whether there has been actual
confusion.196
In sum, applying traditional trademark law to an allegedly infringing
trademark tattoo could result in liability for the tattooed person. Given that
the most common remedy in trademark infringement lawsuits is an injunc-
tion, there are serious questions about fashioning appropriate relief under
such circumstances. A court would have to determine how to craft an appro-
priate injunction, which could come at the cost of serious autonomy limita-
tions for the person with a trademark tattoo.
In addition to trademark infringement, the party could also find herself
exposed to trademark dilution claims, which are addressed below.
2. Proving Trademark Dilution Against a Party With a Trademark Tattoo
A party with a trademark tattoo may also be found liable for dilution if
the trademark in question is famous within the meaning of the statute. This
is the possible even in the “absence of actual or likely confusion, of competi-
tion, or of actual economic injury.”197 A trademark dilution claim under the
TDRA requires proof that:
(1) That the plaintiff owns a famous mark that is distinctive,
193. See Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 317 F.3d 209, 219 (2d Cir. 2003)
(rejecting expert testimony that “New Yorkers ‘tend to be savvy and knowledgeable about
restaurants and food’”).
194. See McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1136 (2d Cir. 1979). To
address the “bridging the gap” factor, a trademark owner would typically set forth evidence
showing a present intention or plan for expansion. Id. at 1135-36.
195. Everyman Espresso had only been in business for four years before it received the
State of New York’s cease and desist letter. See Newman, supra note 1. Penix has stated that
Everyman Espresso was created in part to represent “fine coffee.” Id.
196. Proof of actual confusion is not required; in fact, it is difficult to prove such confu-
sion in most cases. See Borinquen Biscuit Corp. v. M.V. Trading Corp., 443 F.3d 112 (1st Cir.
2006).
197. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 263 (4th
Cir. 2007) (stating that “no actual confusion is required to prove a case of trademark infringe-
ment, although the presence of actual confusion can be persuasive evidence relating to a likeli-
hood of confusion”).
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(2) That the defendant has commenced using a mark in commerce
that allegedly is diluting the famous mark,
(3) That a similarity between the defendant’s mark and the famous
mark gives rise to an association between the marks, and
(4) That the association is likely to impair the distinctiveness of the
famous mark or likely to harm the reputation of the famous mark.198
The TDRA provides defenses to dilution, including fair use, news reporting
and commentary, and noncommercial use.199
Regarding the fame requirement, it will be likely that the class of plain-
tiffs at issue have very popular, well-known marks. Most of the documented
trademark tattoos are those that have large followings of brand enthusiasts,
like the NIKE swoosh and Harley-Davidson eagle.200 Whether or not these
trademarks also meet the requisite level of famousness under the TDRA is a
separate question. The fame standard is a challenging, arduous requirement
reserved for a rare class of trademarks.201 The TDRA provides several fac-
tors that can be used to determine a trademark’s relative degree of fame,
including:
(i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and
publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the
owner or third parties,
(ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods
or services offered under the mark,
(iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark,
(iv) Whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3,
1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal
register.202
198. Id. at 264-65.
199. Id. at 265; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2012).
200. See supra notes 126-136 and accompanying text.
201. “Dilution is meant to be a special remedy for only a narrow class of famous marks,
and against only a narrow class of uses that are likely to impair the distinctiveness or harm the
reputation of the famous mark, thereby decreasing the power of the brand.” Trademark Dilu-
tion: Hearing on H.R. 683 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Prop-
erty, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Anne Gundlefinger, President, International Trademark
Association). Courts are discriminating in applying this federal standard to trademarks due to
its anti-competitive nature. MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 24:104.
202. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (2012). Lawyers and courts have found it incredibly difficult
to determine which trademarks meet the fame standards outlined in the TDRA. See generally
Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Fame Law: Requiring Proof of National Fame in Trademark Law, 33
CARDOZO L. REV. 89 (2011) (“Judicial struggle with the ‘fame’ requirement is due to . . . the
wording of the statute and judicial failure to grasp legislative history and intent in interpreting
the statute with respect to ‘fame.’”).
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Each of these factors should be weighed in determining the famousness of a
trademark.203
In the context of the earlier Everyman Espresso hypothetical, only the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) has considered whether or not
the trademark “I ♥ NY” is famous.204 It did so under the Federal Circuit’s
likelihood of confusion standard, which is less rigorous and a lower standard
than that of trademark dilution.205 The analysis, however, is still instructive
because it provides the facts necessary to begin to analyze the Everyman
Espresso hypothetical. In finding that “I ♥ NY” is famous, the TTAB noted
that between FY 2003-2004 through FY 2007-2008, the State of New York
had spent more than $40 million on marketing materials featuring the trade-
mark.206 In addition, the logo was “identified as one of the best known logos
in the United States, if not the world,” “probably the world’s most recog-
nized place-brand;” and “ranked as the world’s 24th top logo based on
whether the logo had a positive effect on perceptions of the company among
employees and the public.”207 These facts, taken together, seem to support a
finding of famousness based on the first three dilution requirements. The
fourth factor relates to whether the trademark is registered on the Principal
Register with the USPTO.208 Here, the State of New York owns several
trademark registrations for “I ♥ NY” on the Principal Register.209
Regarding the use in commerce requirement, this analysis would rely on
information similar to the earlier likelihood of confusion assessment.210 As
mentioned earlier, there could be any number of scenarios where individuals
will use their trademark tattoos in commerce within the ambit of trademark
law. Commercial endeavors abound both in the real world and in the digital
universe given the ubiquity of social media and Internet interconnectivity,
particularly with respect to personal photographs. In the Everyman Espresso
203. See Report of the Trademark Rev. Commission, 77 Trademark Rep. 375, 460 (1987)
(“The enumerated factors are designed to guide the court. No one factor is controlling and a
court may consider factors which are not listed.”). Some federal circuits, however, have held
that the TDRA “does not require that courts strictly apply every factor in the statute.” Times
Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 166 (3d Cir. 2000).
204. See New York State Dep’t of Econ. Dev. v. Ramapo Valley Brewery, 2010 WL
985321 (T.T.A.B. 2010).
205. See Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772,
396 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“While dilution fame is an either/or proposition—fame
either does or does not exist—likelihood of confusion fame varies along a spectrum from very
strong to very weak.”). As applied to a likelihood of confusion analysis, the question of fame
depends on the nature of the putative infringer’s use. MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 24:104. In
the dilution context, a mark either is or is not famous, and the designation only applies to a
select “category of truly elite marks.” Id.
206. Ramapo, 2010 WL 985321, at *3.
207. Id.
208. MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 24:106.
209. See supra note 183.
210. See supra notes 148-151 and accompanying text.
256 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 22:225
hypothetical, there is no question that Penix was using his tattoo and the
Everyman Espresso logo in marketing materials to promote his coffee shop.
As such, this would be considered a use in commerce that is alleged to dilute
the “I ♥ NY” trademark.
Determining the degree of similarity between Penix’s tattoo and the “I ♥
NY” trademark, and whether such similarities give rise to an association
between the two marks, is quite a subjective analysis.211 Though identical
similarity is not required, courts have not provided much guidance regarding
the threshold degree of similarity that must be crossed to support a likeli-
hood of confusion finding.212 Several jurisdictions compare conflicting
trademarks on the basis of sight, sound, and meaning.213 If the total impres-
sion of the trademarks is the same, this will support a likelihood of confu-
sion finding.214 Regarding sight and meaning, the letters “I” and “NY” in
Penix’s tattoo appear in identical font, color and typeface as the same letters
in the “I ♥ NY” trademark and were also pronounced the same way.215 The
heart in the “I ♥ NY” trademark and the coffee cup in Penix’s tattoo both
appeared in red, though the heart is shaded in and the coffee cup is not.216
These give the same overall impression – a phrase expressing fondness for
things related to New York City. Even Penix stated that he wanted the coffee
shop’s brand to stand for “an in-your-face passion for New York City.”217 As
such, the similarities give rise to an association between the two trademarks.
The final requirement necessitates an analysis of dilution by blurring (by
impairing the famous trademark’s distinctiveness) and dilution by tarnish-
ment (“by harming the reputation of the famous mark). In analyzing dilution
by blurring, the relevant factors include:
(i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the
famous mark,
(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the fa-
mous mark,
(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging
in substantially exclusive use of the mark,
211. Some scholars have referred to this factor as “nothing more than a subjective ‘eye-
ball’ test.” See MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 23:25 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Ex-
change, Inc., 628 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1980); General Foods Corp. v. Ito Yokado Co., 219
U.S.P.Q. 822 (T.T.A.B. 1983); Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. v. Ocean Garden Products, Inc.,
223 U.S.P.Q. 1027 (T.T.A.B. 1984) (parentheticals omitted)).
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1392 (9th Cir. 1993);
First Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 645, 653 (10th Cir. 1996); Sensient
Techs. Corp. v. SensoryEffects Flavor Co., 613 F.3d 754, 765 (8th Cir. 2010).
214. See In re Triple R Mfg. Corp., 168 U.S.P.Q. 447 (T.T.A.B. 1970).
215. See infra, Appendix A and B.
216. Id.
217. See Newman, supra note 1.
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(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark,
(v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create
an association with the famous mark,
(vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade name and the
famous mark.218
Congress has provided no statutory guidelines for dilution by tarnishment.
In the dilution by blurring case, factors (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) should
weigh in favor of the trademark owner in most instances for many of the
reasons stated earlier. Most parties who get trademark tattoos want those
tattoos to be identical to symbols of their beloved brands. In addition, the
types of trademarks that are most often replicated are the most popular, dis-
tinctive, and well-known.219 Factors (v) and (vi) would necessarily invite an
assessment of the party’s intent in getting the tattoo, their actual use of the
tattoo, and the impact that the use has on the famous mark.220
In the Everyman Espresso hypothetical, it is unclear whether Penix
knew that “I ♥ NY” was trademarked at all.221 It is also unclear whether any
“actual associations” arose  during that period. Both seem unlikely. Interest-
ingly, however, factor (iii), which asks whether the famous trademark’s
owner has engaged in substantially exclusive use of the trademark, may also
weigh in Everyman Espresso’s favor, because the “I ♥ NY” trademark is
notoriously infringed by third parties.222 Therefore, Everyman Espresso may
not be exposed to dilution by blurring.
Dilution by tarnishment, on the other hand, could pose issues for people
with trademark tattoos. A trademark may be tarnished when it “is portrayed
in an unwholesome or unsavory context, with the result that the public will
associate the lack of quality or lack of prestige in the defendant’s goods with
the plaintiff’s unrelated goods.”223 In addition, while dilution by tarnishment
is typically found in cases related to sexual activity, drug use, or obscenity, it
is not limited to sordid activities.224 Though courts have not yet grappled
218. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2012).
219. See supra notes 129-136 and accompanying text.
220. See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 267
(4th Cir. 2007).
221. Indeed, most people do not even realize that “I ♥ NY” is trademarked. See Wagner
v. City of New York, No. 14-CV-2521 VEC, 2015 WL 5707326, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28,
2015).
222. Ramirez, supra note 4 (noting that almost all of the “I ♥ NY” products in Midtown
Manhattan are unauthorized).
223. Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
224. See J&B Wholesale Distributing, Inc. v. Redux Beverages, LLC, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d
1623 (D. Minn. 2007) (finding tarnishment in unauthorized use of NO NAME trademark in
connection with beverage formerly called COCAINE); America Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F.
Supp. 2d 548, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1857, 107 A.L.R.5th 781 (E.D. Va. 1998) (finding AOL trade-
mark tarnished by unauthorized use in spam email messages); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui,
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with this question, any analysis must give consideration to the growing per-
vasiveness and acceptance of tattoos by mainstream society. It seems, how-
ever, that dilution by tarnishment could pose a liability risk to people with
trademark tattoos. In Penix’s case, he was using the trademark to sell coffee,
which does not seem to portray the “I ♥ NY” trademark in an unwholesome
or unsavory context. Regarding trademark tattoos, the mere act of tattooing
the trademark on a human body may be considered “unwholesome or unsa-
vory” to some.225 It is unlikely, however, that Penix would be found liable
under a cause of action for tarnishment.
B. Trademark Remedies
Assuming a trademark owner’s lawsuit for infringement or dilution is
successful, the likely relief will be an injunction. When crafting an appropri-
ate remedy for trademark infringement, a court may limit conduct that is
otherwise legal and permissible.226 Courts, therefore, can broadly fashion in-
junctive relief to dissuade future infringement.227 Courts should balance the
rights of the trademark owner with the interests and liberties of the parties
with trademark tattoos.228
In trademark cases, injunctive relief is critically important because of
the need to prevent consumer confusion.229 There will be practical difficulty
in determining how to accomplish this goal when considering trademark tat-
toos. To date, the author has not seen any cases like this appear before a
court. Parties engaged in conflict over trademark tattoos typically settle such
matters long before litigation ensues. At best, this Article can only posit
what remedies a court might craft. Shall a party be required to cover their
tattoo with a band, adhesive covering, or makeup for appearances that may
be considered “use in commerce”? Should the tattooed party position them-
selves in a manner that hides the offending tattoo? Or, in a worst-case scena-
rio, could a court require that the tattoo be removed or covered with more
permanent ink? Some scholars have noted that disclaimers may be used in
unique circumstances to eliminate consumer confusion,230 but in the context
of tattoos this would prove to be at minimum, impractical, and at best, in-
credibly invasive. The challenges of crafting the appropriate injunction
40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1836 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (finding that “‘Adults R Us’ tarnishes the ‘R Us’ family
of marks by associating them with a line of sexual products”).
225. See Perzanowski, supra note 14, at 518-21 (tracing the history of tattoos in the
United States and noting that tattoos have not always been well-accepted in this country).
226. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 390
(5th Cir. 1977).
227. Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 317 F.3d 209, 220 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[A]
court can frame an injunction which will keep a proven infringer safely away from the perime-
ter of future infringement.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
228. See Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 20, at 130.
229. See id. at 130.
230. Id.
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under such circumstances may persuade some judges to apply an ill-fitting
defense to the infringing party’s conduct, thereby ignoring the question
altogether.231
Sidestepping the issue, however, does not address the practical implica-
tions of allowing trademark remedies to restrict or otherwise impose upon
the liberties of the tattooed parties. As seen in earlier instances, trademark
owners have already requested such restrictions through informal phone
calls and cease and desist letters.232
These pragmatic challenges illustrate that trademark law is currently ill-
equipped to deal with questions related to trademark tattoos.233 Though a
legal solution is necessary to address the gaping legal hole created by the use
of trademarks as tattoos, the next Part of this Article argues that the Thir-
teenth Amendment cannot be used to eliminate the enforcement of tradi-
tional trademark infringement and dilution remedies.
III. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT - NO RIGHT TO “FREE” SKIN
The Thirteenth Amendment and contemporary trademark law doctrine
are strange bedfellows, seemingly existing on different planets in the legal
universe. Nevertheless, it has been argued that the Thirteenth Amendment is
rooted in principles that are germane to a discussion of potential enforce-
ment mechanisms and remedies for tattoo-based intellectual property in-
fringement.234 Applying this argument to a practical example, imagine that
the State of New York filed a trademark lawsuit against Sam Penix based on
his “I [coffee cup] NY” tattoo and that Penix is found liable for trademark
infringement or dilution. The next step, of course, would be for a court to
provide relief to the State of New York, likely in the form of an injunction.
The basic premise of a Thirteenth Amendment argument would be that, re-
gardless of the State of New York’s trademark rights, a court should not be
allowed to force Penix to remove the tattoo, or preclude, any activity involv-
ing the tattoo because doing so would be sanctioning slavery or involuntary
servitude. As argued below, it is unlikely that enforcement suits against
trademark tattoos can be likened to slavery or involuntary servitude under
the Thirteenth Amendment, or that a Thirteenth Amendment argument could
form the basis for disallowing a court to provide injunctive relief to trade-
mark owners.
Professor David Nimmer made the Thirteenth Amendment-intellectual
property connection in a copyright lawsuit involving Mike Tyson’s tribal
231. See id.
232. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 1.
233. See Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 20, at 130 (noting that “the difficulty in crafting
an appropriate remedy may influence some courts to find” unauthorized uses permissible
under other areas of law).
234. But c.f. King, supra note 25, at 159 n.184.
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face tattoo.235 There, S. Victor Whitmill, the original tattoo artist who
claimed to own all copyrights in the tattoo’s design, sued Warner Bros., who
planned to release a film called The Hangover 2 in which one of the actors
bore a tattoo nearly identical to the design tattooed on Tyson’s face.236 Pro-
fessor Nimmer, who was retained by Warner Bros. as an expert witness,
opined that tattoos could not be the subject of traditional copyright protec-
tion in part because of the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on slavery
and involuntary servitude.237 Stating that, “the design inked onto a human
being should never constitute the property of another individual,” Professor
Nimmer encouraged the court to deny copyright protection to tattoos.238 Oth-
erwise, he argued, the consequences “include[d] the possibility that a court
could order the bearer not to remove it . . . ; or to order the bearer to undergo
laser removal . . . ; or to prevent magazine, television, and film coverage of
the bearer with the tattoo . . . .”239 In merely one line of his declaration,
Professor Nimmer offered, seemingly as an afterthought, that his interpreta-
tion was “necessary to avoid the constitutional infirmity that would arise if
the Copyright Act attempted to set at naught the Thirteenth Amendment’s
prohibition of badges of slavery.”240
Prior to the lawsuit, Professor Nimmer had written in a footnote in his
authoritative treatise, Nimmer on Copyright, that a tattoo affixed to human
flesh could qualify for copyright protection.241 He also authored one other
article in 2001 that made a passing reference to bodily property and slavery.
There, Professor Nimmer pondered whether a cosmetic surgeon who dra-
matically altered the physical appearance of a patient could claim copyright
protection in the patient’s augmented body.242 He ultimately decided that the
human body could not be subject to copyright claims after cogitating that
“any court presented with such an obscene claim [should] dismiss it summa-
rily, if on no other basis than the constitutional prohibition on involuntary
servitude and other badges of slavery.”243 There was no mention in the arti-
cle of tattoos or a specific reference to the Thirteenth Amendment.
Scholars have roundly disagreed with Professor Nimmer’s statements in
the Whitmill declaration, noting that copyright protection should indeed ex-
235. Nimmer Declaration ¶ 45.
236. Nimmer Declaration ¶ 3.
237. Nimmer Declaration ¶ 45.
238. Id. at P. 48.
239. Id. at P. 47.
240. Id. at P. 45.
241. See 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01
[B][1][i] n.392.
242. See David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and Originality,
38 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 29 (2001).
243. Id.
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tend to tattoos based on fundamental concepts of copyright law.244 Neither
Professor Nimmer nor the many dissenting voices have provided meaningful
treatment to the trademark-related issues raised by such arguments, though
some have noted the practical difficulty of dealing with tattoo-related trade-
mark disputes.245 These arguments and analyses, however, are naturally ap-
plicable to a discussion of how to enforce trademark law against parties
bearing trademark tattoos.246 In particular, the consequences are essentially
the same. This Part of the Article will analyze the Thirteenth Amendment
through the framework of trademark law and critique Professor Nimmer’s
suggestion that the amendment precludes the enforcement of intellectual
property rights as applied to tattoos.
The Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery in 1865, provides
in Section 1 that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdic-
tion.”247 Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment empowers Congress to en-
force this ban “by appropriate legislation.”248
There is a general consensus among scholars that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment applies to both state and private actors.249  In 1905, the Supreme Court
noted that the amendment:
[D]enounces a status or condition, irrespective of the manner or au-
thority by which it is created. The prohibitions of the [Fourteenth]
and [Fifteenth] Amendments are largely upon the acts of the states;
but the [Thirteenth] Amendment names no party or authority, but
simply forbids slavery and involuntary servitude, [and] grants to
244. See, e.g., Lesicko, supra note 25; King, supra note 25; Cummings, supra note 25.
Other scholars have suggested that Professor Nimmer reconfigured his opinion to benefit his
then-client, Warner Brothers. See Ann Bartow, When a treatise writer tries to reconfigure
copyright law to benefit a client, THE MADISONIAN (May 25, 2011), http://madisonian.net/
2011/05/25/when-a-treatise-writer-tries-to-reconfigure-copyright-law-to-benefit-a-client (stat-
ing that “Nimmer holds himself out as the nation’s authority on copyright law, and he’s pro-
vided a pretty clear road map here about how instrumental and client driven his legal analysis
is”).
245. Some have suggested that trademark law is not a “good ‘fit’” for cases involving
tattoos, but this is as deep as any analysis to date has gone. See Cotter & Mirabole, supra note
20, at 131.
246. Indeed, other commentators have noted that tattoos raise issues in both the copyright
and trademark realm. See, e.g., Beasley, supra note 25, at 1144 n.44 (stating that, “[e]xploring
the issues implicated by the tattooing of trademarked symbols and art is an avenue for further
investigation”); see also Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 20, at 123-31.
247. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
248. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
249. See, e.g., Ryan D. Walters, The Thirteenth Amendment “Exception” to the State
Action Doctrine: An Originalist Reappraisal, 23 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 283, 289
(2013); George Rutherglen, State Action, Private Action, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 94
VA. L. REV. 1367, 1391 (2008).
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Congress power to enforce this prohibition by appropriate legisla-
tion. The differences between the [Thirteenth] and subsequent
amendments have been so fully considered by this [C]ourt that it is
enough to refer to the decisions.250
Though Section 1 can apply to private actors, its language will likely fall
short of providing parties tattooed with a trademark the foundation for es-
caping either liability or Draconian remedies potentially sanctioned by trade-
mark law.
Section 1 expressly abolishes American slavery, but it was written to
further encompass “involuntary servitude,” which has been interpreted “to
cover those forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery which in
practical operation would tend to produce like undesirable results.”251 The
outermost limits of this language, though difficult to delineate, do not em-
brace even the most extreme injunctions based on trademark infringement.252
In United States v. Kozminski, the seminal case interpreting the term
“involuntary servitude,” two men with mental disabilities were “found labor-
ing on [a] farm in poor health, in squalid conditions, and in relative isolation
from the rest of society.253 Their captors used psychological coercion, threats
of institutionalization, and physical abuse to keep the men on the farm.254
The captors were charged with several crimes based on their violation of the
two men’s Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from involuntary servi-
tude.255  The Supreme Court held that involuntary servitude requires “a con-
dition of servitude in which the victim is forced to work for the defendant by
the use or threat of physical restraint or physical injury, or by the use or
threat of coercion through law or the legal process,” except under excep-
tional circumstances.256 The Court rejected the Government’s arguments that
involuntary servitude could also encompass other forms of coercion.257 In
particular, the government urged the Court to adopt a broad definition of
involuntary servitude, “which would prohibit the compulsion of services by
250. See Walters, supra note 249, at 289 (citing Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207,
216 (1905)).
251. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988).
252. See id.
253. Id. at 931.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 961 (Brennan, J., concurring) (recounting that the relevant
definitions of “servitude” include, “[c]ondition[s] of a slave; slavery; serfdom; bondage; state
of compulsory subjection to a master,” and “[t]he condition of a slave; a state of subjection to a
master or to arbitrary power of any kind”); Justice Brennan stated in a concurring opinion that
Section 1 should include any coercion that looks like pre-Civil War slavery (noting that rele-
vant factors include “complete domination over all aspects of the victim’s life, oppressive
working and living conditions, and lack of pay or personal freedom are the hallmarks of that
slave-like condition of servitude”). Id. at 962-63.
257. Id. at 952.
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any means that, from the victim’s point of view, either leaves the victim with
no tolerable alternative but to serve the defendant or deprives the victim of
the power of choice.”258 The Court was concerned that this would criminal-
ize day-to-day activities and be wholly dependent on the victim’s state of
mind.259 Ultimately, the captors’ convictions were reversed and the case was
remanded for a new trial, because the District Court’s instructional definition
of involuntary servitude was too broad.
The permissible trademark remedies (injunctive relief and/or money
damages) also pale in comparison to other cases where courts have had to
determine the existence of involuntary servitudes. In Clyatt v. United
States,260 for example, the Court held that peonage, a condition in which the
person is forced by a master’s threats to work off a debt, is compulsory
service and thus involuntary servitude. In Clyatt, two parties were held in
peonage against their will to “work out a debt” they owed to a group of
men.261 In finding that the victims had no choice but to either work or face
legal penalties, the Court noted that the Thirteenth Amendment “denounces
a status or condition, irrespective of the manner or authority by which it is
created.”262 Relatedly, the Court has also invalidated state laws that allowed
a person fined for a misdemeanor to agree to work for a surety who would,
in exchange for such work, pay the convict’s misdemeanor fine to the appro-
priate agency.263 Finally, the Court has also struck down state laws subject-
ing debtors to prosecution and criminal punishment for failing to work off a
debt after receiving advance compensation.264
In the trademark tattoo context, infringing parties are not forced to work
by use or threat of physical restraint or injury, or by the use or threat of
coercion through the law or legal process. Indeed, they are not forced to
work in any sense. Unlike the brands forcibly placed onto African and Afri-
can-American slaves, the vast majority of tattoos in the United States are
volitionally obtained. Even if a party with a trademark tattoo is found liable
for trademark infringement or dilution, they will be subject to, at best, an
injunction that requires behavior modification, and at worst (though un-
likely), an injunction that requires body modification. Therefore, Section 1
would not apply.
While Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment only applies to slavery
and involuntary servitude, Section 2 gives Congress broad authority to pass
258. Id. at 949.
259. Id. at 949-50.
260. 197 U.S. at 215-16.
261. Id. at 214.
262. Id. at 216.
263. United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 146-49 (1914).
264. See, e.g., Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219
(1911).
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legislation enforcing Section 1’s ban on forced labor.265 Section 2 also has
been interpreted broadly to allow Congress to craft other types of legisla-
tion.266 Congress is further empowered “to pass all laws necessary and
proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United
States.”267 Using its Section 2 power, Congress has passed legislation
prohibiting racial discrimination in contracts, property matters like convey-
ances and the sale of real estate, and punishing race-based crimes on public
property.268 Even so, the type of activity that constitutes a badge or incident
of slavery has not been well defined in the courts or in the literature.269
Many scholars have implored Congress to craft legislation under its Sec-
tion 2 powers related to a vast array of legal issues tied to historically
marginalized groups of people, including “hate crimes, hate speech, racial
profiling, disproportionate capital sentencing of black defendants, violence
against women, sexual harassment, reproductive rights, and gay mar-
riage.”270 Others have taken a much more expansive view of Section 2,
claiming that the badges and incidents of slavery should include actions such
as city street closings271 and human cloning.272 Whether tattoos necessitate
legislation under Section 2 requires an analysis of current theoretical
frameworks, as neither Congress nor the Courts provide much guidance in
this arena.
If the interpretation of “badges and incidents of slavery” is considered
on a spectrum, there are three prevailing approaches that exist on the most
extreme points and one sitting squarely in the middle. The narrowest ap-
265. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
266. Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 14 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 561, 563 (2012). The first Supreme Court cases interpreted Section 2 quite nar-
rowly. See United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 640-42 (1883) (finding that the Ku Klux
Klan Act of 1871, designed to enforce criminal penalties for certain racist KKK activities, was
an impermissible exercise of the power under Section 2 because it covered people who had
never been enslaved). Less than one year later, the Supreme Court also held that the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 was an impermissible exercise of Congress’s Section 2 power because
Section 2 did not allow Congress to prohibit race-based discrimination in public spaces. The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20-22 (1883).
267. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20.
268. See McAward, supra note 266, at 563-64.
269. Professor McAward has noted that many questions remain unanswered, including:
“[w]hat, however, qualifies as a badge or incident of slavery? Does this concept refer only to a
public law that discriminates against African Americans or, more generally, on the basis of
race? Alternatively, does it encompass any public or private practice that perpetuates racial
inferiority? Or is its scope even broader, extending to any act motivated by arbitrary class
prejudice?” See id. at 564 (internal quotation marks omitted).
270. Id. at 564 (internal citations omitted).
271. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 124-26 (1981).
272. Sean Charles Vinck, Note, Does the Thirteenth Amendment Provide a Jurisdictional
Basis for a Federal Ban on Cloning?, 30 J. LEGIS. 183, 185-86 (2003) (stating that “[t]he
Thirteenth Amendment is a particularly promising source of . . . authority” for a federal clon-
ing ban).
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proach is based wholly on race-based discrimination. The broadest approach
applies to any type of class-based subjugation. The middle ground approach
focuses on race and previous histories of servitude. Contrary to Professor
Nimmer’s argument, none of these approaches provide tattooed parties with
any protection under the Thirteenth Amendment.273
The narrow approach, articulated by both Judge A. Leon Higginbot-
ham274 and Judge John Minor Wisdom,275 requires that conduct “(1) target
African-Americans as a class, (2) in a way that labels them inferior, and (3)
is historically linked to slavery and its aftermath.”276 Clearly, under this ap-
proach, trademark infringing or diluting tattoos cannot seek solace in the
Thirteenth Amendment. Trademark enforcement does not target African-
Americans in a way that labels them inferior. While there may be an attenu-
ated connection between slave branding and trademark tattoos,277 trademark
tattoos are not linked to slavery or its aftermath. Thus, trademark enforce-
ment over infringing tattoos would not be prohibited by the Thirteenth
Amendment under this approach.
Nor does the middle ground approach, proposed by Professor Jennifer
Mason McAward, prohibit trademark enforcement over infringing tattoos.
Professor McAward’s proposed approach to the badges and incidents of
slavery allows Congress to act under Section 2 where there is
[P]ublic or widespread private conduct that targets a group on the
basis of race or previous condition of servitude, that mimics the law
of slavery, and that poses a substantial risk that the members of the
targeted population will be returned to de facto slavery or otherwise
denied the ability to participate in the basic transactions of civil
society.278
Here, trademark enforcement does not target a group on the basis of race or
previous condition of servitude—it targets people who have allegedly com-
mitted trademark infringement. Nor does being subject to an injunction
mimic the law of slavery. Finally, there is no risk that trademark infringers
with trademark tattoos will be returned to slavery. There could be an issue of
participating in the “basic transactions of civil society,” if a broad injunction
273. To the author’s knowledge, Professor Nimmer has not publicly expounded on the
statements made in his declaration and how he came to such conclusions. Other scholars,
however, have called his statements both “rather shocking” and “shockingly unconvincing.”
See Bartow, supra note 244, at 496.
274. See Pennsylvania v. Local Union No. 542, Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 347 F.
Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
275. See Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1570 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc)
(Wisdom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
276. See McAward, supra note 266, at 600.
277. See supra, Part II.A, C (discussing history of slave branding and contemporary
trademark tattoos).
278. See McAward, supra note 266, at 606.
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is granted disallowing photos and other appearances. Regardless, this un-
likely scenario still cannot meet the other factors proposed by Professor
McAward.
The broadest approach to defining the badges and incidents of slavery
has been proposed by Professor Sidney Buchanan.279 This approach suggests
that a badge or incident of slavery is “any act motivated by arbitrary class
prejudice which, in its cumulative manifestations, has assumed a pattern of
regional significance.”280 This approach does not limit the framework to race
at all; conduct can be based on any number of group commonalities.281 The
first logical key here is whether the acts are arbitrary. With respect to trade-
mark infringement or dilution lawsuits, such actions are not arbitrary but
based on the conduct of the alleged infringer. This would foreclose Thir-
teenth Amendment protection to infringers bearing trademark tattoos. In ad-
dition, trademark infringement is not generally regional, but merely tied to
the location of the alleged infringer.282
Though Professor Nimmer’s claims raise novel questions, the Thirteenth
Amendment is not the appropriate vehicle to insulate tattooed infringers
from liability for trademark infringement. As a practical matter, courts his-
torically interpret the Thirteenth Amendment to be inextricably linked to
matters of race and racial discrimination. Though scholars have offered crea-
tive expansions of Section 2, it is unlikely that trademark tattoos will fall
within the ambit of the badges and incidents of slavery.
CONCLUSION
Tattoos will likely continue to grow in popularity as social attitudes and
technology progress.283 Millennials are tattooing their bodies at increasing
rates, and with such realities will necessarily come more brand enthusiasts
willing to permanently ink their favorite logos on their bodies. The digital
age will also lead to more opportunities to capitalize on one’s personal brand
through photos, videos, and other new media. As Sam Penix learned, this
can also lead to liability exposure when trademark owners believe tattoos are
likely to confuse or dilute the goodwill they have worked hard to obtain. As
alarming as it might be to consider the parade of horribles that may emerge
279. G. Sidney Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth
Amendment, 12 HOUS. L. REV. 1069, 1073 (1975).
280. McAward, supra note 266, at 602 (citing Buchanan, supra note 279, at 1072, 1077).
281. Buchanan, supra note 279, at 1084 (“There is nothing in the nature of the trait upon
which a given act of discrimination is based that limits congressional power under § 2 of the
thirteenth amendment.”).
282. However, the Everyman Espresso question raises a unique question in this regard.
Presumably, the “I ♥ NY” trademark would be used and likely infringed in greater numbers in
the State of New York, and more specifically in areas populated with many tourists.
283. Indeed, both Nokia Corporation and Motorola Mobility, Inc. have filed patent appli-
cations on tattoos that can be connected to cellular phones. See U.S. Patent No. US 2012/
0062371 (filed Sept. 13, 2011); U.S. Patent No. US 2013/0297301 (filed May 3, 2012).
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through injunctive relief, the Thirteenth Amendment is not an appropriate
means of combating such fears. Trademark law, much like the tattoo uni-
verse, will have to innovate to come up with creative solutions to enforce-
ment concerns.
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APPENDIX A.
FIGURE 1. THE BELOW FIGURE DEPICTS THE EVERYMAN ESPRESSO LOGO
FEATURING SAM PENIX’S FIST AND TATTOO.284
FIGURE 2. THE BELOW IMAGE DEPICTS SAM PENIX’S TATTOO.285
284. EVERYMAN ESPRESSO (Feb. 20, 2013), http://web.archive.org/web/
20130412143639/http://everymanespresso.com/.
285. Newman, supra note 1.
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APPENDIX B.
FIGURE 3. THE IMAGE BELOW DEPICTS THE MOST COMMON
REPRESENTATION OF THE “I ♥ NY” TRADEMARK.286
286. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 3,097,782 (filed Apr. 22, 2005).
